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This study explores how firms' ownership structures affect their earnings quality and long-term performance.
Focusing on a unique sample of private firms for which there is financial data available in the years
before and after their initial public offering (IPO), I differentiate between those that have private equity
sponsorship (PE-backed firms) and those that do not (non-PE-backed firms). The findings indicate
that PE-backed firms generally have higher earnings quality than those that do not have PE sponsorship,
engage less in earnings management and report more conservatively both before and after the IPO.
Further, PE-backed firms that are majority-owned by PE sponsors exhibit superior long-term stock
price performance after they go public. These results stem from the professional ownership, tighter
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Although private firms have a significant presence in the U.S. market, constituting 99% 
of companies,
1 their accounting practices remain largely unknown due mainly to the lack of 
publicly  available  financial  statements.
2  Using  a  unique  sample  of  firms  with  privately  held 
equity and publicly held debt for which complete and standardized financial data is available,
3 
this study explores how the ownership structure of a firm affects its financial reporting practices, 
financial performance, and stock returns in the years preceding and following IPO. Two different 
ownership structures of pre-IPO firms are considered – those with private equity sponsorship 
(PE-backed firms) and those with no outside sponsorship (non-PE-backed firms).
4  
PE sponsors have become prominent in the U.S. capital markets, participating in more 
than one-third of IPOs and in more than one-quarter of the U.S. mergers during the past few 
years. The value of private equity buyouts in the United States surged to $220 billion in 2006, 
and  $438  billion  in  private-equity  deals  were  announced  in  2007.
5  This  rapid  growth  and 
globalization  of  the  PE  industry  has  raised  demands  for  increased  regulation  and  disclosure 
within the sector due to concerns regarding anticompetitive behavior, excessive tax benefits, and 
                                                            
1 See AICPA web site: http://www.aicpa.org/download/news/2004/Discussion_Paper_5-10-04.pdf. 
2 Indeed, Hand (2005), who uses prospectus information to gain insight into private firms, emphasizes that he is 
“unaware of any other systematic, large-sample source of financial statement data for pre-IPO companies.” 
3 Only scant data is available on privately held firms in the United States, with the exception of firms in regulated 
industries such as financial and insurance companies (Beatty and Harris 1998, Mikhail 1999, Beatty et al. 2002). 
Private firms with public debt are nevertheless subject to the same financial reporting regulations as public firms 
under sections 13 and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This sample includes such large and familiar 
firms as J. Crew, Sealy Corp., and UPS. 
4 PE-backed firms are majority- or minority-owned by PE sponsors, investment firms such as the Blackstone Group, 
Texas Pacific Group, and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co., which generally buy mature businesses via leveraged 
buyout (LBO) or management buyout (MBO) transactions and take them private. Non-PE-backed firms are defined 
in this study as firms that are majority owned by management and do not have PE-sponsorship.  
5 Investment Dealers’ Digest, February 23, 2006; Economist.com, February 8, 2007; Forbes, December 10, 2007; 
and USA Today, January 29, 2008.   2
stock manipulation.
6 PE-backed IPOs (also known as reverse-LBOs), in particular, have recently 
been the subject of public scrutiny.
7  
Despite their economic importance and the management expertise they  bring, little is 
known about the role PE sponsors play in their portfolio companies’ accounting practices. Most 
prior research has focused on venture capital (VC) firms rather than PE sponsors. Although 
studies  of  the  role  of  VC  firms  yield  valuable  (albeit  mixed)  insights  into  how  ownership 
structure affects accounting practices, findings from such studies cannot be generalized to PE 
sponsors owing to significant institutional differences between VC firms and PE sponsors.
8  
Hence,  this  study  sets  out  to  test  how  PE  sponsors’  alleged  opportunistic  behavior 
(Degeorge and Zeckhauser 1993), on the one hand, combined with their tighter monitoring and 
reputational  considerations  (e.g.,  Cao  and  Lerner  2006),  on  the  other,  affect  earnings 
management, conservatism, and post-IPO performance compared to non-PE-backed firms owned 
and controlled by their management teams. To accomplish this, I leverage a unique sample of 
147  IPOs (1,070 firm-year observations) that occurred between 1980 and 2005, for which a 




                                                            
6 The Wall Street Journal, October 10, 2006; The Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2007; BusinessWeek, April 26, 
2007; Associated Press, July 11, 2007.  
7 Newspaper headlines such as “Private equity walks on water. But more of its new issues sink like a stone than you 
would think” refer to reverse LBOs that went sour, such as Refco, Inc. and Sealy Corporation, the stock price of 
which dropped 59% in the 19 months following its IPO (Forbes, December 10, 2007). 
8 For example, unlike VC firms, which invest in early-stage, mostly not yet profitable firms and rarely use bank 
debt, PE sponsors generally buy mature, profitable businesses via leveraged buyout (LBO) or management buyout 
(MBO) transactions, finance the transactions with large portions of bank debt, and typically assume control of the 
board of directors, but are generally less likely than VC firms to assume operational control (for further discussion, 
see section II).   3
I  first  compare  the  tendency  of  PE-backed  and  non-PE-backed  firms  to  engage  in 
earnings management in the period surrounding an IPO (five years before and five years after). I 
find that PE-backed firms engage in significantly less upward earnings management than non-
PE-backed  firms  both  pre-  and  post-IPO,  consistent  with  tighter  monitoring  by,  and  the 
reputational considerations of, PE sponsors.  
I also examine whether PE-backed and non-PE-backed firms differ with respect to timely 
loss  recognition.  Although  all  firm-year  observations  in  my  sample  are  subject  to  identical 
financial reporting regulations, the results suggest that PE-backed firms recognize losses in a 
timelier manner than non-PE-backed firms, especially in the pre-IPO period. This is consistent 
with the greater demand for timely information these firms face from both PE sponsor-owners 
and debt holders. Furthermore, PE sponsors that can better anticipate and prepare their portfolio 
firms for future IPOs (Gompers 1995, Kaplan and Strömberg 2003) are expected to report more 
conservatively due to public investors’ anticipated demands.  
Finally, I test whether post-IPO, long-term financial and stock-price performance are 
associated with characteristics of ownership status and PE sponsor size. This study documents 
that in the post-IPO period, majority ownership by a PE sponsor is associated with better long-
term stock price performance, and minority ownership by a PE sponsor with worse long-term 
financial  and  stock  price  performance,  than  ownership  by  management,  and  that  larger  PE 
sponsor size is positively associated with better long-term financial and stock price performance 
when  the  firm  goes  public.  These  findings  are  consistent  with  the  monitoring  role  of  PE 
sponsors.  Moreover,  having  PE  sponsors  with  higher  ownership  stakes,  especially  larger  PE 
sponsors with greater capital under management (as a reputation proxy), is expected to contribute 
to even tighter monitoring and, hence, better long-term performance.   4
This paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. First, the study furthers 
our  understanding  of  how  ownership  concentration  and  structure  affect  financial  reporting 
practices (e.g., Leuz et al. 2003, Haw et al. 2004, and Leuz 2006, among others). The present 
study focuses, in particular, on the role of PE sponsors, which has attracted little attention in the 
recent academic literature, mainly due to research design limitations imposed by lack of publicly 
available  pre-IPO  financial  statements.  The  complete  and  standardized  financial  information 
available for my sample of PE-backed firms for a period of five years before the IPO enables me 
to overcome these limitations, and to address the accounting reporting differences between PE-
backed and non-PE-backed firms.    
Second, this paper contributes to the literature on earnings management in the context of 
IPOs in general (e.g., Aharony et al. 1993, Teoh et al. 1998, 1998a), and IPOs that are backed by 
private equity sponsors and VCs, in particular (Chou et al. 2006, Hochberg 2006, Morsfield and 
Tan 2006, Wongsunwai 2007). These studies have relied heavily on prospectus filings, which 
have  been  shown  to  be  contaminated  by  optimistic  bias,  window  dressing,  and  earnings 
manipulation (Ang and Brau 2002).
9 Recent literature has raised further the concern that receipt 
of  IPO  proceeds  during  the  year  of  IPO  might  inflate  the  earnings  management  measures 
reported  in  these  studies  (Ball  and  Shivakumar  2006b).  I  avoid  retrospectively  prepared 
prospectus financials in favor of audited 10Ks filed in real time, and am further able to rely on 
pre-IPO financials.  
Third, this study also expands upon the growing literature on the post-IPO performance 
of U.S. PE-backed firms. This literature, which focuses mainly on the market performance of 
reverse-LBOs as compared to “ordinary” IPOs (DeGeorge and Zeckhauser 1993, Holthausen and 
                                                            
9 According to paragraph 29 of Accounting Principles Board Opinion No. 20, companies filing publicly for the first 
time are permitted a restatement.    5
Larcker  1996,  and,  more  recently,  Cao  and  Lerner  2006),  documents  better  long-term 
performance  by  reverse-LBO  firms.  But  other  differences,  beyond  differences  in  ownership 
structure, can affect these findings. For example, reverse-LBOs are mature firms that return to 
the  public  market,  whereas  ordinary  IPOs  are  more  commonly  much  younger  growth  firms 
without a financial reporting history. That both the PE-backed and non-PE-backed firms in my 
sample are mature firms enables me to better focus on the effect of ownership structure.
10  
Finally,  although  private  firms  are  important  players  in  the  U.S.  market,
11  their 
accounting  practices  remain  largely  unknown  due  mainly  to  the  lack  of  publicly  available 
financials. My unique sample of private firms with public debt, also examined by Givoly et al. 
(2007b), makes it possible to broaden our understanding of the reporting practices of U.S. private 
firms in a variety of industries and under different ownership structures. My findings on the 
effect of ownership structure are important to stakeholders such as banks, customers, employees, 
and suppliers that depend on the financial health of private firms.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the motivation 
for and theory that underlies the hypotheses. Section III describes the data collection procedures 
and research design, section IV the sample descriptive statistics. Results are presented in section 
V. Section VI reports the results of a variety of robustness checks. Section VII concludes with a 
discussion and implications for future research.  
 
 
                                                            
10 Chou et al. (2006) address the influence of ownership structure on abnormal market returns in the post-IPO period 
and conclude that, except for effects propagated through earnings management, acquirer status (PE sponsor versus 
management-owner)  has  little  additional  influence  on  post-issue  price  performance.  Hence,  whether  ownership 
status influences post-IPO performance remains an empirical question. 
11 The 500 largest private firms together employed 4.4 million people and had revenues of $1.4 trillion (Forbes, 
November 27, 2006). Beyond their ubiquity, the financial reporting of private firms is of particular interest. In June 
2006, the AICPA and FASB agreed to create a joint committee to improve the financial reporting process for private 
firms.   6
II. MOTIVATION, THEORY, AND HYPOTHESES 
Private Equity Sponsors  
The present study focuses on the role of PE sponsors, which has attracted little attention 
in the recent academic literature relative to the considerable attention devoted to the role of 
another type of private investor, VC firms.  
The evidence to date regarding the effect of VC ownership structure on earnings quality 
is limited and mixed. Several recent VC studies document less upward earnings management by 
VC-backed IPOs (as measured by lower discretionary accruals) than is observed in non-VC-
backed IPOs (Hochberg 2006, Morsfield and Tan 2006). Wongsunwai (2007) further finds that 
post-IPO  firms  backed  by  higher-quality  VCs  have  lower  discretionary  accruals  and  lower 
likelihood  of  financial  restatements.  Other  VC  studies,  however,  document  lower  earnings 
quality in the presence of VCs. For example, Cohen and Langberg (2005) document that reported 
accounting earnings are less informative for VC-backed firms than for non-VC-backed firms, 
and Darrough and Rangan (2005) find VCs’ share sales in the year of the IPO to be negatively 
associated with R&D spending changes under some specifications, consistent with these VCs’ 
incentive to increase reported earnings. 
There  are  also  important  institutional  differences  between  VC-backed  and  PE-backed 
IPOs that make it difficult to rely on the findings of the VC literature in the PE context.
12 For 
example, unlike VCs, which invest in early-stage and mostly not yet profitable companies, PE 
sponsors  generally  buy  mature,  profitable  businesses  that  had  been  subject  to  full  financial 
disclosure before the IPO. The expected, much reduced information asymmetry between issuer 
and investors (Cai 2002) further limits opportunities for PE sponsors to manage earnings before 
                                                            
12 Indeed, the VC literature actually excludes PE-backed firms from its analysis (e.g., Hochberg 2006).   7
the IPO.
13 On the other hand, PE sponsors hold their portfolio firms through LBO funds that 
have limited life spans of 10-12 years, and usually share around 20% of the upside gain via 
carried interest (in addition to management fees of about 2% of the assets under management).
14 
Hence, PE sponsors have a strong incentive to file for IPO before the funds mature, and further 
incentive to manage reported earnings upward if needed in order to maximize profits from their 
investments (Cao 2007).
15  
Indeed,  the  only  U.S.  study  of  which  I  am  aware  that  addresses  the  influence  of 
ownership  structure  (PE-backed  versus  non-PE-backed)  on  accounting  practices,  Chou  et  al. 
(2006), identifies significant upward earnings management (positive discretionary accruals) in 
the year of an IPO only in PE-backed firms. But the authors cannot conclude that PE sponsors’ 
involvement in upward earnings management is greater than that of management-owners due to 
the small sample size. These findings, although statistically insignificant, are surprising in light 
of the results reported above in the VC literature.
16 Whether ownership status influences pre-IPO 
earnings  management  thus  remains  an  empirical  question.  The  complete  and  standardized 
financial information available for my sample of PE-backed firms before the IPO lends deeper 
                                                            
13 Although information asymmetry might be lower for my sample, the price effect of earnings management might 
be higher than in the case of “ordinary” IPOs and VC-backed firms, which, having little to no earnings history, have 
little or no earnings to manage (Chou et al. 2006). 
14 In contrast, VCs rarely charge up-front investment banking or management fees (Sahlman 1990).  
15 Additional differences between PE sponsors and VCs are documented in the literature. PE-backed firms tend to 
have large enterprise value and use bank debt; PE sponsors generally acquire mature, established companies and 
seek a majority stake; profit levels are crucial and technology considerations largely irrelevant; and PE managers 
typically come from an accounting, investment banking, or management consulting background. VC-backed firms, 
on the other hand, tend to have small enterprise value and rarely use bank debt; generally acquire young companies 
and start-ups and take only a minority stake; the portfolio firms, though mostly not profitable, are always developing 
or  applying  new  technology;  and  VC  managers  have  often  been  successful  start-up  entrepreneurs  or  possess 
specialized technology expertise (Hand 2005, Chou et al. 2006, Morsfield and Tan 2006, Fraser-Sampson 2007, 
Klein and Zur 2007). Furthermore, PE sponsors typically assume control of the board of directors, but are generally 
less likely than VCs to assume operational control, and PE sponsors’ compensation is more highly sensitive to value 
creation (Sahlman 1990, Wright and Robbie 1998). 
16 I was able to replicate the results of Chou et al. (2006) for PE-backed firms in the year of IPO using the Jones 
(1991) cross sectional current accruals model. I also identify significant positive discretionary abnormal accruals in 
PE-backed firms; however, my results indicate that their involvement in upward earnings management during the 
IPO year is lower than that of management-owners (see the discussion in section V).   8
insight  into  their  reporting  practices,  and  enables  me  to  re-address  the  accounting  reporting 
differences between PE-backed and non-PE-backed firms.      
 
Earnings Management   
The evidence to date regarding the effect of ownership structure (PE-backed versus non-
PE-backed) on earnings management is limited and mixed.  
On  one  hand,  theory  and  empirical  evidence  support  the  prediction  that  the  active 
monitoring  associated  with  the  presence  of  PE  sponsors  inhibits  earnings  management.  PE 
sponsors are likely to play a role in restructuring management compensation, and can actively 
monitor and motivate management by virtue of their board membership (Gompers 1995, Lerner 
1995,  Cotter  and  Peck  2001,  Renneboog  and  Simons  2005).  Tighter  monitoring,  more 
sophisticated ownership, and board membership are, in turn, expected to be associated with less 
earnings  management  (e.g.,  Xie  et  al.  2003,  Cornett  et  al.  2005,  Wongsunwai  2007).  The 
separation of management and control enhance the monitoring role of these PE-sponsors, as 
compared to non-PE-backed firms, which are both owned and controlled by their management 
teams  and,  hence,  expected  to  manage  earnings  further  at  the  expense  of  future  owners.  
Furthermore,  being  repeat  players  in  the  LBO  debt  market  as  well  as  the  IPO  market,  PE 
sponsors risk reputation loss if their LBOs or IPOs fail (Cotter and Peck 2001, Cao and Lerner 
2006), which also can lead to less upward earnings management by PE-backed firms. 
On the other hand, theory and empirical evidence support greater earnings management 
by PE-backed than by non-PE-backed firms, especially in the period surrounding an IPO. First, 
Degeorge  and  Zeckhauser  (1993)  suggest  that PE-backed  firms’  decision  to  return  to  public 
listing is driven by opportunistic behavior and IPO timing. If PE-backed firms indeed go public   9
because  they  have  exhausted  the  benefits  of  the  LBO  ownership  form  or  their  profits  are 
insufficient to cover their debt load, I would expect them to manage earnings upward to a greater 
extent  than  non-PE-backed  firms.  Second,  managers  who  feel  more  compelled  to  meet  the 
earnings goals of the sophisticated PE sponsors for whom they work might, at least in principle, 
have greater motivation to manage earnings (Cornett et al. 2005). Finally, prior literature also 
documents that differences in firms’ ownership concentration can affect reporting incentives and 
earnings  management.  Because  in  a  more  concentrated  ownership  structure,  large  owners 
typically sit on the board and are often directly involved in firm management, communicating 
firm performance via financial statements becomes less important than earnings management 
intended to hide expropriation activities from outside investors (Leuz 2006).
17 Given that firms 
that are majority owned by PE sponsors have higher ownership concentration than firms that are 
owned by management (see Table 4), I further expect them to have greater propensity to manage 
earnings. 
Although  it  remains  an  empirical  question  whether  PE-backed  firms  engage  in  more 
upward  earnings  management  than  non-PE-backed  firms,  my  first  hypothesis  (stated  in 
alternative form), consistent with the monitoring role of PE sponsors, is:  
 
H1: Non-PE-backed firms engage in upward earnings management to a greater extent 
than do PE-backed firms. 
 
                                                            
17  Indeed,  both  Leuz  et  al.  (2003)  and  Haw  et  al.  (2004)  document  a  positive  correlation  between  earnings 
management and ownership concentration, at least in firms with high levels of management ownership (Yeo et al. 
2002).   10 
Timely Loss Recognition (Conservatism)   
Prior literature identifies timely loss recognition as an important attribute of financial 
reporting quality (e.g., Basu 1997, Ball and Shivakumar 2005, Givoly et al. 2007a).
18  
I expect PE-backed firms to have more timely loss recognition than non-PE-backed firms 
because they face greater demand for timely information. First, Ball and Shivakumar (2006b) 
document that U.K. private firms begin to report more conservatively a few years before public 
listing in anticipation of expected post-IPO demands of public investors and the public market 
enforcement mechanism. Because PE sponsors can better anticipate and prepare their portfolio 
firms for future IPOs (Gompers 1995, Kaplan and Strömberg 2003), I expect PE-backed firms to 
report more conservatively in the pre-IPO period than non-PE-backed firms that cannot as easily 
anticipate  the  exit.  Second,  that  PE-backed  private  firms  tend  to  have  significantly  higher 
leverage  than  non-PE-backed  private  firms  (see  Table  2,  Panel  A)  can  lead  debt  holders  to 
demand more timely loss recognition (Ball et al. 2005). Finally, Kaplan and Strömberg (2003) 
show  that  PE  sponsors  make  control  rights  contingent  on  financial  as  well  as  non-financial 
measures, which can trigger a harsher financial reporting discipline than for firms owned by 
management and, hence, increase demand for higher-quality accounting information. 
Alternative theory and empirical evidence support less timely loss recognition by PE-
backed firms. Because, due to their higher ownership concentration (see Table 4), PE sponsor-
owners can more easily resolve any information asymmetry through “insider access” and thus 
have less need to rely on public disclosure, they have less incentive to incorporate economic 
losses into accounting income in a timely manner (for a discussion of “insider access,” see Ball 
                                                            
18 Basu (1997) defines conservatism as follows: “Accountants’ tendency to require a higher degree of verification 
for recognizing good news than bad news in financial statements … earnings reflect bad news more quickly than 
good news.” Pre-IPO firms in my sample do not have stock prices. Therefore, following Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005), who compared private and public firms in the United Kingdom, I use a conservatism model that does not 
require stock prices (see the discussion in section III).   11 
et al. 2000 and Francis et al. 2005). Support can also be found in the VC literature, Cohen and 
Langberg (2005) finding that, on average, reported earnings are less informative for VC-backed 
firms, and that the value of, and information within, reported earnings decrease as a function of 
VC ownership. 
Consistent  with  the  financial  reporting  discipline  created  by  PE  sponsors,  my  next 
hypothesis (stated in alternative form) is:   
 
H2: PE-backed firms are more likely than non-PE-backed firms to recognize losses in a 
timely fashion. 
 
Post-IPO Abnormal Returns and Financial Performance   
Having tested the effect of ownership structure (PE-backed versus non-PE-backed) on 
earnings quality, I next test whether ownership structure also affects long-term reported financial 
performance and market abnormal returns in the post-IPO period.  
I  expect  PE-backed  firms  to  have  better  long-term  financial  performance  and  market 
abnormal returns than non-PE-backed firms. To the extent that PE-backed firms, as hypothesized 
above, have lower pre-IPO discretionary accruals than non-PE-backed firms, reported earnings 
in the post-IPO years as well as overall reported financial performance are expected to reverse 
and deteriorate to a lesser degree (Teoh, Wong, and Rao 1998). This better earnings quality is 
also  predicted  to  lead  to  relatively  higher  market  abnormal  returns  (Chou  et  al.  2006). 
Furthermore, in addition to giving financial and strategic advice, PE sponsors play a monitoring 
role in their portfolio firms  (Gompers 1995, Lerner 1995), and tighter monitoring is documented 
to  lead  to  better  earnings  quality  (Wongsunwai  2007)  as  well  as  better  long-term  financial 
performance (Ivanov et al. 2008) and better market abnormal returns (Cao and Lerner 2006).    12 
I noted above the counter argument that PE-backed firms’ decision to return to public 
listing is driven by opportunistic behavior and IPO timing. If PE-backed firms go public because 
they have exhausted the benefits of the LBO ownership form or their profits are insufficient to 
cover  their  debt  load,  their  operating  performance  following  the  IPO  would  be  expected  to 
deteriorate  to  a  greater  extent  than  that  of  non-PE-backed  firms  (Degeorge  and  Zeckhauser 
1993).  Furthermore,  improvements  in  the  financial  performance  of  PE-backed  firms  that  go 
private can also be explained by agency theory, in particular, greater goal congruence between 
owners  and  management,  stronger  incentives  to  create  shareholder  wealth  as  management’s 
ownership stake increases, and the disciplinary role of higher leverage (Kaplan 1991, Holthausen 
and Larcker 1996, Bruton et al. 2002). When a company returns to public listing, manager and 
owner interests and incentives once again diverge, monitoring costs increase, leverage decreases, 
and  agency  theory,  as  noted  above,  predicts  a  reintroduction  of  inefficiencies  and  loss  of 
previously experienced performance gains (Bruton et al. 2002). Finally, other factors such as 
managerial  risk  aversion  or  managerial  entrenchment  might  occasion  performance  increases 
following a reverse buyout of management-owned as opposed to PE-backed firms (Holthausen 
and Larcker 1996). 
Consistent with the higher earnings quality and better monitoring and control associated 
with PE sponsor owners, my next hypothesis (stated in alternative form) is:   
 
H3:  PE-backed  firms  are  likely  to  have  better  long-term  financial  and  stock  price 
performance in the post-IPO period than non-PE-backed firms.  
 
   13 
III. SAMPLE SELECTION AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Sample Selection  
My  sample  of  private  firms  with  public  debt  covers  all  firm-year  observations  on 
COMPUSTAT  for  any  of  the  28  years  from  1978  through  2005  that  satisfy  the  following 
criteria:
19  (1) the firm’s stock price at fiscal year end is unavailable; (2) the firm has total debt as 
well as total annual revenue exceeding $1 million; (3) the firm is a separate domestic company; 
and (4) the firms is not a subsidiary of another public firm. I further exclude financial institutions 
and firms in regulated industries (SIC codes 6000-6999 and 4800-4900). 
To ensure that my sample includes only private firms with public debt, I examine each firm 
and remove public firm observations (details are provided in Table 1).
20 I further categorize each 
firm as being in one of the following pre-IPO, mutually exclusive categories:  (1) PE majority-
owned, defined as firms that are majority-owned (more than 50%) by PE sponsors;
21 (2) PE 
minority-owned, defined as firms that are minority-owned (equal to or less than 50%) by PE 
sponsors; (3) management-owned, defined as firms having no PE sponsor ownership and that are 
at least 50% owned by the founders, executives, and directors, or family members; (4) employee-
owned, defined as firms having no PE sponsor ownership and that are at least 50% owned by 
their  employees;  and  (5)  unknown,  defined  as  there  being  no  information  available  on  firm 
ownership. Finally,  I identify  changes in organization type due to equity  IPOs, mergers and 
acquisitions, bankruptcies, and deregistration (form type 15-15D). The resulting sample, which 
                                                            
19 Prior to 1980, leveraged takeover activity was limited and few private firms held public debt. Indeed, one of the 
first instances (if not the first) of a private firm with public debt was Movado in 1979.  
20 Because some public firms met the above criteria as a result of missing price data, to further determine whether 
firms qualified as private firms with public debt, I hand-collected SEC filings information from EDGAR and 10K 
Wizard,  bankruptcy  information  from  BankruptcyData.com,  and  other  historical  information  from  Hoover’s 
DataBase as well as from several news resources including Factiva, ProQuest, and LexisNexis. I omitted 355 firm-
year  observations  of  cooperatives,  limited  partnerships,  and  government-owned  firms  that  might  have  different 
earnings management incentives resulting from their organizational and ownership structures. 
21 The list of PE sponsors was taken from the Thomson Financials VentureXpert database.    14 
includes 2,810 firm-year observations and 557 private firms (for the years 1980-2005), is used 
for the descriptive statistics reported in Table 2.  
To focus the analysis on the period surrounding the IPO, defined as five years before and 
five years after the IPO, I further remove all non-IPO firms. The final sample, which includes 
123  PE-backed  (both  majority-  and  minority-owned)  IPOs  and  24  management-owned  IPOs 
(hereafter referred to as non-PE-backed, or management-owned, firms), is used for the analyses 
that follow.
22  
I identify the IPO date and first-day-of-trading returns using the Corporate New Issues 
database of Securities Data Company (SDC). For the returns analysis, I require that each IPO be 
listed in CRSP. For firms in the pre-IPO phase, corporate governance information (e.g., board 
characteristics, compensation structure) is collected from 10Ks and proxies in the year prior to 
the IPO. I use prospectus information to identify changes in corporate governance post-IPO, and 
the  Thomson  Financials  VentureXpert  database  to  rank  PE  sponsors  according  to  total 
investment (in $US). 
 
Research Design: Earnings Management 
Unexpected Discretionary Accruals  
   In order to be able to compare my findings to prior research, I use as my comprehensive 
measure of earnings management the cross-sectional modified Jones (1991) model. The Jones 
model  regresses  total  accruals  on  the  change  in  sales,  after  subtracting  the  change  in  trade 
                                                            
22 I use the Heckman (1979) two-stage procedure described at the end of section III to account for the possible 
endogeneity of the choice of going public or receiving PE financing. I do not perform separate analyses for the other 
ownership and organizational forms due to the small number of observations. The main results are unchanged when 
management-owned and employee-owned firms are combined as non-PE-backed firms.    15 
receivables and level of property, plant, and equipment for a test sample of all public firms in the 
same two-digit SIC code and year.
23 
Though widely used in the earnings management literature, accruals models such as the 
modified  Jones  model  are  far  from  perfect  in  detecting  earnings  management.  Because  the 
models assume the relationship between cash flows and accruals to be linear, thus ignoring the 
asymmetry in the gain and loss recognition of accruals, I incorporate in the estimation of the 
modified Jones model the improvement in accruals models proposed by Ball and Shivakumar 
(2006a). Specifically, I add to the model a proxy for potentially reportable gains and losses in the 
form of the sign of the cash flows from operations. Consistent with the results reported by Ball 
and Shivakumar (2006a), the introduction of this proxy increases the explanatory power of the 
model considerably.
24  
Because performance might be a key driver of both a firm’s decision to go public and PE 
sponsors’ provision of financial backing (Morsfield and Tan 2006), I employ in an untabulated 
analysis the Kothari et al. (2005) performance-matching approach.
25 For the year of IPO, I also 
report the results of the current unexpected discretionary accruals model derived from the cross-
                                                            
23 Specifically, I estimate the following regression cross-sectionally, and further require that at least ten observations 
be available before performing each regression:  
TACCj,t / TAj, t–1 = a1*[1 / TAj, t–1] + a2*[(∆REVj, t – ∆TRj, t)/TAj, t–1] + a3*[PPEj, t / TAj, t–1]  
where: TACCj, is total accruals for firm j in year t. Following Hribar and Collins (2002), I define total accruals as the 
difference between income before extraordinary items (#123) and net cash flow from operating activities, adjusted 
to extraordinary items and discontinued operations (#308 – #124). For the years prior to 1988, when COMPUSTAT 
item #308 is unavailable, I define total accruals as follows: ∆(current assets #4) – ∆(current liabilities #5) – ∆(cash 
#1) + ∆(short-term debt #34) – (depreciation and amortization #125). TAj,t–1 is the beginning-of-the-year total assets 
(lagged #6). ∆REVj, is the change in sales in year t (#12), PPEj, is gross property, plant, and equipment in year t (#7), 
and ∆TRj, is the change in trade receivables in year t (#151). In addition, to correct for measurement errors in the 
balance-sheet approach prior to 1988, I eliminated firm-year observations with "non-articulation" events: merger or 
acquisition, discontinued operations, and gain or loss on foreign currency translations (Hribar and Collins 2002). 
24 In particular, I augmented the modified Jones model with the following independent variables: cash flow from 
operations in year t (CFt), a dummy variable set to 1 if CFt <1 and 0 otherwise (DCFt), and an interactive variable, 
CFt x DCFt (Ball and Shivakumar 2006a). 
25 Specifically, I use the performance measure suggested by Kothari et al. (2005), ROA, which is defined as net 
income (COMPUSTAT data item #172) plus net of tax interest expense (#15) divided by total assets at end of year 
t–1 (lagged #6). I match each observation by industry, year, and the deciles of ROA in the same industry and year.      16 
sectional modified Jones model used by Teoh et al. (1998a, 1998b), Morsfield and Tan (2006), 
and Chou et al. (2006).
26  
Additional Earnings Management Measure  
Following Penman and Zhang (2004), the operating activities for clean surplus relation 
leads to Operating Incomej,t = Free Cash Flowj,t + ∆NOAj,t. The free cash flow is the “hard” 
aspect,  ∆NOAj,t  the  “soft”  aspect,  of  the  operating  income  calculation,  which  involves 
discretionary measurements and estimations.
27 ∆NOAj,t can therefore be used as an additional 
signal of earnings management, where: 
growth in net operating assets: GNOAj,t = (NOAj,t – NOAj,t–1)/|NOAj,t–1|  (1) 
Because changes in measures can be attributed to external factors and period effects, 
following  prior  literature  (Teoh  et  al.  1998b),  I  report  the  differences  between  the  GNOA 
measure for each firm and the median measure for the same year and industry (4-digit SIC codes 
if there are at least five non-IPO firms, otherwise 3-digit SIC codes or 2-digit SIC codes with at 
least five observations). 
To minimize survivorship bias, I report the average of five years’ annual UTACC and 
GNOA variables, using the maximum number of years for which COMPUSTAT data is available 
                                                            
26 Current accruals are defined as the difference between the change in noncash current assets and the change in 
current operating liabilities. The unexpected discretionary accruals are estimated from a cross-sectional regression, 
in the same year and industry, of current accruals on the change in sales, both scaled by prior year total assets.  
27 I define NOA as follows. Common equity: [common equity (#60) + preferred treasury stock (#227) – preferred 
dividends in arrears (#242)] + financial obligations: [debt in current liabilities (#34) + total long-term debt (#9) + 
preferred stock (#130) – preferred treasury stock (#227) + preferred dividends in arrears (#242)] – financial assets: 
[cash and short-term investments (#1) + investments and advances minus other (#32)] + minority interest (#38). 
I  define  Operating  Income  as  follows.  Earnings:  [net  income  (#172)  –  preferred  dividends  (#19)  +  change  in 
marketable securities adjustment (change in #238) + change in cumulative translation adjustment (change in #230)] 
+ net interest expense: [after-tax interest expense (#15 × (1 – marginal tax rate)) + preferred dividends (#19) – after-
tax  interest  income  (#62  ×  (1  –  marginal  tax  rate))  +  minority  interest  in  income  (#49)  minus  the  change  in 
marketable securities adjustment (change in #238)], where the marginal tax rate is the top statutory federal tax rate 
plus 2% average state tax rate. The top federal statutory corporate tax rate was 48% in 1971-1978, 46% in 1979-
1986, 40% in 1987, 34% in 1988-1992, and 35% in 1993-2005 (Nissim and Penman 2003).   17 
for firms that do not survive for five full years after their IPO (for further discussion, see Ivanov 
et al. 2008). 
Multivariate Earnings Management Analysis   
I  also  estimate  the  following  regression,  which  allows  for  differences  in  earnings 
management between PE-backed and non-PE-backed firms in order to test H1: 
ΕΜt = a0 + a1*PE + a3*Sizet + a4*BVt + a5*Growtht + a6*Leveraget + a7*Profitabilityt + 
a8*QRatiot + a9*Oper_Cyclet + a10*Aget + a11*Casht + a12*CAPEXt + a13*D_Losst + 
a14*D_Audit_Qualityt + et                                                             (2)           
where: EMt is a measure of earnings management, alternatively defined as UTACCt and GNOAt. 
PE  is  a  dummy  variable  with  the  value  1  for  PE-backed  private  firms  (both  majority-  and 
minority-owned) and 0 for firms owned by management. Size is alternatively defined as the 
natural logarithms of total assets (#6) or sales (#12). BV is equity book value (#60+ #130 + 35#) 
divided by total assets. Growth is defined as growth in sales. Leverage is defined as total debt 
(#9 + #34) divided by total assets. Profitability is defined as operating income divided by net 
operating assets (RNOA). QRatio is the quick ratio, defined as cash and short-term investment 
(#1) plus total receivables (#2) divided by current liabilities (#5). Oper_Cycle is operating cycle 
days (receivable collection period plus inventory turnover in days). Age is defined as number of 
years  since  incorporation  (first  appearance  on  COMPUSTAT).  Cash  is  cash  and  short-term 
investment divided by total assets. CAPEX is capital expenditures (#128) divided by total assets. 




                                                            
28 The above control variables were used in the prior literature in the context of IPOs and the choice of private equity 
financing, in particular, size, growth, leverage, and profitability (Chou et al. 2006, Morsfield and Tan 2006), and 
age, investments, and liquidity (Beuselinck et al. 2005). The audit firm’s size was added because it can influence 
firms’ earnings management and timely loss recognition (Aharony et al. 1993, Basu et al. 2001, Morsfield and Tan 
2006).    18 
Research Design: Timely Loss Recognition  
Earnings  are  more  conservative  when  losses  are  recognized  in  a  timely  manner,  as 
emphasized by Basu (1997), in whose model stock returns are used as a proxy for economic 
gains and losses. Ball and Shivakumar (2005), who do not have stock returns for their sample of 
pure private firms, use changes in accounting income as the independent variables associated 
with transitory gains and losses. In a similar way, I estimate the following variation of Basu’s 
regression to allow for differences in timely loss recognition between PE-backed and non-PE-
backed firms in order to test H2:
29 
∆OpIt = a0 + a1*D∆OpIt–1 + a2*∆OpIt–1 + a3*D∆OpIt–1*∆OpIt–1 + a4*PE + a5*PE*D∆OpIt–1 +                             
+ a6*PE*∆OpIt–1 + a7*PE*D∆OpIt–1*∆OpIt–1 + et                                                           (3)           
where: ∆OpIt is changes in earnings from year t–1 to year t, standardized by total assets at the 
end of  year t–1. Earnings are measured before interest expense and interest income (OpI).
30 
D∆OpIt–1 is a dummy variable that gets the value 1 if ∆OpIt –1<0 and 0 otherwise. PE is a dummy 
variable with the value 1 for PE-backed firms and 0 for non-PE-backed firms. 
I predict that the involvement of PE sponsors leads to a higher level of earnings quality, as 
measured  by  more  timely  loss  recognition.  As  a  result,  I  anticipate  that  persistent  gain 
recognition will be greater for PE-backed than for non-PE-backed private firms, and therefore 
expect a6>0. I also expect timely loss recognition to be greater for PE-backed than for non-PE-
backed private firms, and therefore expect a7<0.  
That the timely loss recognition identified above is a result neither of random errors in 
accruals nor of earnings management is supported by the results of an alternate model developed 
by Ball and Shivakumar (2005) that recognizes unrealized gains and losses via accruals. Dechow 
                                                            
29 This variation on Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) regression was used in Beuselinck et al. (2005). I further estimate 
regressions (5) and (6) separately for the pre- and post-IPO periods.  
30 The results remain qualitatively similar when I measure, in an untabulated analysis, earnings before and after 
extraordinary items.     19 
et al. (1998) show that accruals can mitigate the noise in operating cash flow and lead to a 
negative correlation between accruals and cash flow. Ball and Shivakumar (2005) also identify a 
second role of accruals: timely recognition of economic gains and losses leads to a positive but 
asymmetric correlation between accruals and contemporaneous cash flow. Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005) maintain that the asymmetry in the accruals model exists because in non-cash items there 
is more timely recognition of economic losses than of economic gains. Therefore, the second role 
of accruals is greater in the case of losses. Following Beuselinck et al. (2005), I run the following 
variation of Ball and Shivakumar’s (2005) regression:  
ACCt =    b0 + b1*DCFOt + b2*CFOt + b3*DCFOt*CFOt + b4*PE + b5* PE *DCFOt +                           
+ b6* PE *CFOt + b7* PE *DCFOt*CFOt + et                                                               (4) 
where: ACCt is total accruals in year t, standardized by beginning-of-the-year total assets. For the 
definition  of  accruals,  see  the  discussion  of  abnormal  accruals  above.  Following  Hribar  and 
Collins (2002), CFOt is defined, for years after 1988, as cash from operations in year t, adjusted 
to extraordinary items and discontinued operations (#308 – #124), and standardized by total 
assets at end of year t–1.
31 DCFOt is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 if CFOt < 0 and 0 
otherwise. PE is as defined above. 
Following Ball and Shivakumar (2005), I predict that the above model will demonstrate 
the strong role of accruals in mitigating noise in operating cash flow. I therefore expect b2<0. I 
also predict that PE sponsor involvement leads to higher earnings quality, which, in turn, leads to 
a  positive  but  asymmetric  correlation  between  accruals  and  contemporaneous  cash  flow.  I 
therefore predict that the coefficient b7>0.  
                                                            
31 Following Xie (2001), for years prior to 1988, I define cash flow from operations as funds from operations 
(COMPUSTAT data item #110) – ∆(current assets #4)t + ∆(cash and cash equivalent #1)t + ∆(current liabilities #5)t 
– ∆(short-term debt #34)t. All variables are divided by total assets at end of year t–1 (lagged #6).   20 
I account for the possible endogeneity of receiving PE financing by using the Heckman 
(1979) two-stage procedure. In the first stage, I estimate a PROBIT model with, as predictors, 
size (alternatively defined as the natural logarithms of total assets or sales), ratio of book value of 
equity to total assets, growth (in sales), leverage, profitability (RNOA), quick ratio, length of the 
operating cycle, age, cash and capital expenditures (both divided by total assets), a dummy for 
loss firms, and audit quality (a dummy for the big national accounting firms). Estimates of the 
PROBIT model are used to compute the inverse Mills’ ratio for each sample firm. In the second 
stage, I include the inverse Mills’ ratio as a control variable in regressions (2), (3), and (4) and 
allow the coefficient to vary between the two groups of firms. (For similar implementations, see 
Ball and Shivakumar 2005, Beuselinck et al. 2005, Hochberg 2006, and Givoly et al. 2007b).  
 
Research Design: Abnormal Returns and Financial Performance 
For each IPO, the adjusted size and book-to-market matched returns are calculated as the 
buy-and-hold daily returns for the periods of one year, three years, and five years after the IPO, 
less  the  buy-and-hold  returns  on  a  benchmark  of  a  value-weighted  size  and  book-to-market 
matched control sample for the same period (the daily matched portfolio returns as well as the 
relevant breakpoints are from Kenneth French’s Web site).
32 If the sample firm delists during the 
relevant period, I add the delist return to the firm’s buy-and-hold return and set the size and 
book-to-market matched return equal to zero after the delisting date. When the delisting return is 
missing,  following  Shumway  and  Warther  (1999)  and  the  CRSP  “white  paper”  on  delisting 
returns (2001), I allocate it in accordance with the delisting code and exchange code.  
To avoid the problem of overlapping periods in the estimation of buy-and-hold returns, 
following  Chou  et  al.  (2006)  and  Fan  (2007),  I  also  estimate  the  value-weighted  monthly 
                                                            
32 http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.   21 
abnormal returns based on calendar time using the Fama and French (1993) three factor model. 
Specifically, I regress the monthly returns (in excess of the risk free-rate) on the three factors as 
in the following regression: 
Rpt – Rft = ap + bp (Rmt – Rft) + spSMBt + hpHMLt + εt    (5) 
where: Rpt is the equally weighted portfolio returns in calendar month t, Rft is the 30-day T-bill 
yield in month t, Rmt is the return on the value weighted CRSP index, SMBt is the return on small 
firms minus the return on large firms, and HMLt is the return on high book-to-market stocks 
minus  the  return  on  low  book-to-market  stocks  in  month  t.  The  regressions  are  carried  out 
separately for each ownership stake and for different sizes of PE sponsors. The estimate of the 
intercept coefficient (ap) is a measure of average monthly abnormal returns.  
I use three measures of long-run financial performance for the periods of one year, three 
years, and five years after the IPO: industry adjusted operating performance; market-to-book 
ratio; and a stock exchange delisting measure (for similar implementations, see Ivanov et al. 
2008, Moeller et al. 2004, Gompers et al. 2003, and Field and Karpoff  2002).  
The  first  measure  is  industry-adjusted  operating  performance  (ROA),  which  I  use  to 
calculate the average matched-adjusted return on assets for the periods after the IPO. ROA is 
defined as net income (#172) plus net of tax interest expense (#15) divided by total assets at end 
of year t–1 (lagged #6), minus the industry median ROA for the same period (based on 4-digit 
SIC codes if there are at least five non-IPO firms, otherwise the 3-digit SIC codes or 2-digit SIC 
codes with at least five observations). For firms that do not survive for one year, three years, or 
five  years  after  the  IPO,  the  maximum  number  of  years  for  which  COMPUSTAT  data  is 
available is used. The second measure is the market-to-book ratio as measured at the end of one 
year, three years, or five years since the IPO. For firms that do not survive for the full period 
after the IPO, the maximum number of years for which COMPUSTAT data is available is used.   22 
Market value of equity is defined as common shares outstanding (#25) multiplied by the fiscal 
year  closing  price  (#199).  Book  value  of  equity  is  defined  as  total  common  equity  (#60)  + 
carrying value of preferred stock (#130) + deferred taxes and investment tax credit (#35). The 
third measure, stock exchange delisting, is defined as the percentage of firms delisted from the 
NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ due to bankruptcy, default, or liquidation (CRSP delisting codes 
400 and above). 
  Lastly, prior literature having suggested that lead underwriter reputation can affect long-
run IPO returns (e.g., Carter et al. 1998), I report and control for the reputation ranking of IPO 
underwriting.
33  
All returns analyses are performed separately for different ownership stakes and different 
sizes of PE sponsors.  
 
IV. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Descriptive Statistics: Private Firms with Public Debt  
Column 1 of Table 2, Panel A includes descriptive statistics for the entire sample of 
private firms with public debt (2,810 firm-year observations for 557 firms). The remaining data 
in Table 2, Panel A shows the distribution of firms and firm-year observations among various 
ownership forms.  
Private firms majority-owned by PE sponsors make up 57% of the firms in the sample; 
14% are minority-owned by PE sponsors, 22% owned by management.
34 Firms that are majority- 
or  minority-owned  by  PE  sponsors  have  the  highest  leverage  (means  of  76.5%  and  77.9%, 
respectively, versus total sample mean of 68.0%), and firms that  are  majority-owned by PE 
                                                            
33 These rankings, available on Jay Ritter’s Web site: http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/rank.xls, vary from one to nine, 
nine being the best reputation, and are updated. 
34 Because several firms changed ownership structure during the period, the total number of firms adds up to 568.    23 
sponsors  have  the  lowest  assets,  sales  growth,  and  ROA.  However,  as  Panel  B  shows,  the 
different  ownership  forms  have  a  similar  industry  representation  and  there  is  no  particular 
industry clustering.  
As can be seen in Panel C, PE-backed firms have the highest concentration of below-
BBB-ranked debt (68.1% and 62.3% for majority-owned and minority-owned PE-backed firms, 
respectively, versus total sample mean of 55.5%). As can be seen in Panel D, they are also more 
likely to file for bankruptcy protection (17.2% and 19.5%, respectively, versus total sample mean 
of 16.2%). These observations are not surprising inasmuch as PE sponsors tend to be involved in 
LBO and MBO activities, which increase debt levels and, hence, the overall risk of default. 
Moreover, PE-backed private firms (both majority- and minority-owned) are more likely to exit 
via equity IPO (30.1% and 35.1%, respectively, versus total sample mean of 28.4%). This result 
is consistent with the goal of PE sponsors to monetize their investments through an IPO or M&A 
transaction.  
Table 2, Panel E shows that 15.3% of the PE-backed firms in the sample are owned by 
the 14 largest PE sponsors in the market. 
 
Descriptive Statistics: Pre-IPO and Post-IPO Periods  
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for 123 PE-backed firms (96 majority-owned and 
27 minority-owned) and 24 non-PE-backed firms (management-owned) that had IPOs. This table 
compares the firms under the different ownership structures and during two periods: five years 
pre-IPO and five years post-IPO. Consistent with the results in Table 2, Panel A, the PE-backed 
firms have significantly higher leverage than the non-PE-backed firms in the pre- and post-IPO 
periods. PE-backed firms also have significantly lower quick ratios and cash as a percentage of   24 
assets. Moreover, for both PE-backed and non-PE-backed firms, leverage is significantly higher 
in the pre-IPO than in the post-IPO period. This result is not surprising given that many of the 
pre-IPO firms went through an LBO or MBO, which was why they had issued public debt.  
Untabulated  analysis  further  reveals  that  the  involvement  of  PE-backed  and  non-PE-
backed firms in restructuring activity (as indicated by discontinued operations, M&A activity, 
and increases or decreases in asset growth greater than 50%) is not significantly different in the 
period surrounding an IPO. As indicated in Table 3, however, the proportion of special items is 
significantly higher for majority PE-backed than for non-PE-backed firms in the pre-IPO period. 
To  control  for  these  differences,  I  conduct  the  conservatism  analyses  on  operating  income 
definitions that exclude such special items.  
 
Descriptive Statistics: Corporate Governance  
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics for corporate governance among both PE-backed 
firms (both majority- and minority-owned) and management-owned firms in the pre-IPO period. 
As Cao and Lerner (2006) report, PE sponsors have a large ownership stake (79.9% and 36.4%, 
respectively,  for  firms  that  are  majority-  and  minority-owned  by  PE  sponsors)  and  actively 
monitor managers. Indeed, 55.2% and 34%, respectively, of the boards of directors are from or 
affiliated with PE sponsor groups, and PE-backed firms’ boards are significantly larger than 
those of management-owned firms. Moreover, in PE-backed firms, a greater proportion of CEO 
pay is in the form of equity and variable compensation (mainly options and bonuses), which is 
consistent with giving the CEO an incentive to take the company public (Cadman and Sunder 
2007).
35 As further indicated by the post-IPO panel, PE sponsors retain a significant ownership 
                                                            
35 In some instances, PE-backed firms tie the CEO’s bonus to cash-flow performance and EBITDA. For example, 
this  appeared  in  the  1997  10K  of  Family  Restaurants  (majority-owned  by  Apollo  Partners):  “The  Company's   25 
stake (48.9% and 20.8%, respectively, for majority- and minority-owned firms) in the post-IPO 
period,
36 and continue to monitor managers (50.3% and 29.4%, respectively, of the boards of 
directors are from or affiliated with PE sponsor groups). 
 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Results: Earnings Management  
The  results  of  estimating  earnings  management  by  abnormal  accruals  (UTACC)  and 
industry adjusted growth in net operating assets (GNOA) are provided in Table 5, Panel A.
37 
Consistent with my prediction that earnings are managed upward to a lesser extent by PE-backed 
than by non-PE-backed firms, the first line of results in Table 5 indicates that the UTACC means 
of  firms  that  are  majority-  and  minority-owned  by  PE  sponsors  are  -3.7%  and  -4.2%, 
respectively, whereas the mean for management-owned firms is -0.3%. The differences of -3.4% 
and -3.9% are significant at the 0.01 level. Similar results are obtained for the differences in 
GNOA,  when  making  the  comparison  on  medians,  and  for  the  post-IPO  period  (also  after 
including  average  information  in  order  to  minimize  any  survival  bias).  Excepting  the 
significantly less negative GNOA for the majority-PE-owned firms in the pre-IPO period, the 
analysis reveals no significant differences between firms that are majority-owned and minority-
owned by PE sponsors.
38 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
President and Chief Executive Officer … entered into an Employment Agreement with the Company … providing 
for annual compensation of not less than $400,000, to increase to $500,000 upon the attainment of $40,000,000 in 
Company EBITDA.” 
36 An untabulated analysis further reveals that five years after the IPO, PE sponsors retain a significant ownership 
stake  (26.8% and 16.4%, respectively, for majority- and minority-owned firms), as compared to 22.9% ownership 
stake by management for non-PE-backed firms. 
37 Although the hypotheses are stated as one-sided, all empirical results are conducted as two-sided tests.  
38 Untabulated analyses indicate that the main abnormal accruals results remain qualitatively unaltered when I use 
other specifications of the Jones model such as current accruals (with or without control for timely loss recognition 
and the balance sheet approach) and the Kothari et al. (2005) performance-matching approach.     26 
These results also hold when I repeat the analysis for the year-by-year, before and after 
IPO. For most of the years, the differences in both means and medians are more negative for PE-
backed than for non-PE-backed firms.
39  
I do not interpret the results during the IPO year because receipt of IPO proceeds, being 
associated with explosive growth, can affect accruals and working capital (Ball and Shivakumar 
2006b). Following prior literature, I also report in the last line of Table 5, Panel A the results of 
an abnormal current accruals model for the year of IPO. These results are similar in magnitude 
to those obtained for PE-backed firms by Chou et al. (2006), who find only weak evidence that 
PE-backed firms have higher discretionary accruals than non-PE-backed firms, but, due to the 
small sample size, could not conclude that PE sponsors’ involvement was associated with greater 
earnings management. In my sample, there is a weak contrary indication. 
Table 5, Panel B reports the results of regression (2) for the sample of pre- and post-IPO 
firms under two specifications: (1) including control for possible endogeneity, and (2) including 
control  variables  (as  defined  in  section  III).  In  both  periods,  for  both  earnings  management 
measures, and under both specifications, the coefficients, a1, the dummy variables for PE-backed 
firms are negative, by and large significantly so, indicating that earnings are managed upward to 
a lesser extent by PE-backed firms than by non-PE-backed firms. Moreover, the coefficients of 
the inverse Mills’ variables (lambda) are significant when performing the regression on GNOA, 
suggesting the presence of endogeneity and the appropriateness of controlling for it.
40 
                                                            
39 The reported results for the five years pre-IPO and five years post-IPO (but not for the year-by-year analyses) 
exclude firm-year observations during restructuring periods. When performed on the entire sample, the results are 
qualitatively similar.   
40 If firms select PE financing based on either expected abnormal accruals or expected growth in net operating 
assets, the dummy variable PE is endogenous. It is more likely in the GNOA regression because GNOA is correlated 
with growth and profitability, which were identified by prior literature as being associated with the choice of PE 
financing (Chou et al. 2006, Morsfield and Tan 2006). This association was further confirmed by the first stage 
probit model.     27 
Untabulated analyses further reveal the foregoing results to hold for the comparison of 
both majority- and minority-PE-owned firms versus management-owned firms.  
Overall, and consistent with H1, these results indicate that non-PE-backed firms manage 
earnings upward to a greater extent than PE-backed firms (both majority- and minority-owned), 
as indicated by the significantly higher abnormal accruals and GNOA. This is consistent with the 
prediction that PE sponsors restrain earnings management. 
 
Results: Timely Loss Recognition  
Table 6 reports the results of regression (3) for the sample of pre- and post-IPO firms 
under  three  specifications:  (1)  excluding  control  variables,  (2)  including  control  for  possible 
endogeneity, and (3) including control variables.  
For  non-PE-backed  private  firms  in  the  pre-IPO  period,  the  coefficients,  a2,  on  prior 
positive earnings changes are significantly negative, indicating timely recognition of economic 
gains (on average, approximately 45% to 105% reversal of income increases). The incremental 
coefficients,  a3,  on  prior  negative  earnings  changes  are  positive  (but  significant  only  under 
specifications (2) and (3)) indicating that losses are recognized in a less timely manner than 
gains. The sum of the coefficients a2 + a3 is negative under all specifications, but relatively small 
(coefficients’ sums range from -0.05 to -0.30), indicating timely loss recognition, which leads to 
a reversal of income decreases (on average, approximately 5% to 30%). Taken together, these 
results  suggest  that  non-PE-backed  private  firms  appear  to  have  low  earnings  quality  as 
measured by deferred loss recognition.  
The incremental coefficients on earnings increases for PE-backed private firms, a6, are 
significantly positive under the three specifications (with coefficients of 0.55, 0.74, and 1.19, and   28 
t-values of 1.68, 2.30, and 5.12, respectively), indicating that PE-backed private firms are more 
likely than non-PE-backed private firms to defer recognition of economic gains. As I further 
predicted, the incremental coefficients on earnings, a7, decreases for PE-backed firms, and the 
sum of the coefficients, a3 + a7, is significantly negative under all specifications, indicating that 
PE-backed  private  firms  are  more  likely  than  non-PE-backed  private  firms  to  incorporate 
transitory losses in income.  
Table 6 also presents the results of regression (3) for the sample of post-IPO firms. The 
sum of the coefficients, a3 + a7, is significantly negative under the three regression specifications, 
and the main coefficient of interest, a7, is negative (but significant only under specifications (1) 
and (2)).  
Taken  together,  and  consistent  with  H2,  PE-backed  private  firms  have  higher-quality 
earnings reporting than non-PE-backed private firms in both the pre-IPO and post-IPO periods. 
Table 7 reports the results of regression (4), under the above three specifications, for the 
sample of pre- and post-IPO firms.   
In the case of non-PE-backed pre-IPO private firms, the coefficient on prior positive cash 
flow, b2, is significantly negative (with coefficients of -0.28, -0.38, and -0.62, and t-values of       
-2.38, -2.51, and -3.94, for the three specifications, respectively), indicating that, on average, 
between 28% and 62% of cash flow is mitigated by accruals in years with positive cash flow. 
This finding is consistent with the role of accruals in mitigating noise in operating cash flow. The 
coefficient  on  prior  negative  cash  flow,  b3,  is  negative  as  well  (but  insignificant  under 
specification (2)), indicating that non-PE-backed private firms mitigate noise in cash flow to an 
even greater degree in years with negative operating cash flow.   29 
The incremental coefficient, b6, for PE-backed private firms in positive-cash-flow years is 
negative (but significant only in specification (1)), indicating that PE-backed private firms are 
more likely than non-PE-backed private firms to offset cash flow in years with positive cash 
flow.  Also  as  predicted,  the  incremental  coefficient  in  negative-cash-flow  years,  b7,  for  PE-
backed private firms is significantly positive under specifications (1) and (2) (with coefficients of 
2.51,  1.59,  and  1.50,  and  t-values  of  2.58,  1.68,  and  1.59,  respectively),  indicating  that  in 
negative-cash-flow years, the accruals of PE-backed private firms offset cash flow to a lesser 
extent than is the case for non-PE-backed private firms (higher positive correlation). Therefore, 
consistent with H2, earnings reporting in the pre-IPO period are of higher quality for PE-backed 
private  firms  than  for  non-PE-backed  private  firms.  These  results  are  consistent  with  the 
prediction that the involvement of PE sponsors induces higher quality earnings reporting. As 
indicated in Table 7, however, these results no longer hold in the post-IPO period.
41  
That the coefficients of the inverse Mills’ variables (lambda) are significant in neither the 
pre- nor post-IPO period under both regression models, (3) and (4), suggests the absence of 
significant endogeneity problems.
42 
Untabulated  analyses  further  reveal  that  the  results  of  both  conservatism  regression 
models, (3) and (4), hold for the comparison of both majority- and minority-PE-owned firms 
versus management-owned firms.
43   
                                                            
41 As was discussed in section II above, prior literature finds that publicly listed firms report more conservatively 
than private firms to accommodate shareholder demand for higher quality earnings reporting and reduce shareholder 
litigation costs (Skinner 1997, Givoly at al. 2007b). Because these incentives exist as soon as firms are publicly 
listed, regardless of the initial controlling party, they can increase timely loss recognition among non-PE-backed 
firms as well, and thereby reduce the differences between them and PE-backed firms in the post-IPO period.   
42 If firms select PE financing based on either expected changes in operating income or expected accruals, the 
dummy variable PE is endogenous. It is unlikely that a change in operating income will change regression (3) 
because the PE financing decision is unlikely to involve the change in operating income in a single year. It is more 
likely in the accruals regression, because it is specified on levels (for further discussion, see Ball and Shivakumar 
2005).   
43 I re-estimated the conservatism regression models (3) and (4) with six dummy variables, one for each industry, as 
defined in Table 2. The results were qualitatively the same (untabulated).   30 
Results: Abnormal Returns and Financial Performance 
  Table 8, Panel A, which reports the results of both size-and-book-to-market-adjusted 
buy-and-hold returns and financial performance analyses, shows the abnormal returns (between 
one  year  and  five  years)  to  be  significantly  higher  for  firms  majority-owned  than  for  firms 
minority-owned by PE sponsors.
44 For example, the mean of one-year abnormal returns for firms 
majority-owned by PE sponsors is 19.1% (median of 8.8%), but the mean for firms minority-
owned  by  PE  sponsors  is  -9.3%  (median  of  -18.3%).  This  difference  of  28.5%  (27.1%)  is 
significant at the 0.01 level for the medians. In the one-year and three-year periods after the IPO, 
the median returns for firms majority-owned by PE sponsors are also significantly higher than 
for management-owned firms. Firms minority-owned by PE sponsors have the lowest abnormal 
returns in the one-, three-, and five-year periods (for the five-year period, their abnormal return is 
significantly lower than that of management-owned firms). 
  Table 8, Panel A documents that firms minority-owned by PE sponsors also have the 
lowest post-IPO financial performance. In particular, they have the lowest (but not statistically 
significant) industry adjusted ROA and market-to-book ratios (statistically significant for one 
and three years) as well as the highest percentage of post-IPO delistings. Management-owned 
firms, on the other hand, have the highest (but not statistically significant) industry adjusted 
ROA and market-to-book ratios (statistically significant for the one- and three-year periods), and, 
consistent with the findings in Table 5, the highest level of abnormal accruals in the five years 
pre-IPO. 
Table 8, Panel B reports, separately for the different ownership groups, the results of the 
Fama-French three factor calendar time portfolio regressions (5). Consistent with the finding 
                                                            
44 The use of other benchmarks, such as the value-weighted market return index or S&P composite index, yields 
qualitatively similar results. The results are also qualitatively the same when I use cumulative abnormal returns.   31 
above, Panel B indicates that firms minority-owned by PE sponsors have the lowest average 
monthly abnormal returns in the one- and three-year periods (as captured by the estimate of the 
intercept), firms majority-owned by PE sponsors, the highest average monthly abnormal returns. 
Taken together, and consistent with H3, these results suggest that firms majority-owned 
by PE sponsors have higher abnormal returns than firms owned by management despite their 
lower financial performance. These results can be attributed to the PE sponsors’ higher earnings 
quality (less  engagement in upward earnings management  and timelier  loss recognition) and 
capacity for tighter monitoring and control, both pre- and post-IPO. The poor abnormal returns 
of firms minority-owned by PE sponsors can be attributed to their poor financial performance 
and  the  lesser  degree  of  monitoring  and  control  exercised  by  owners  of  minority  stakes  (as 
indicated in Table 4; see the discussion in the following Additional Results section).  
 
Additional Results 
PE Sponsor Ownership Stake (Majority versus Minority)  
Higher ownership stakes by PE sponsors can contribute to tighter monitoring (Cao 2007), 
which  is  expected  to  be  associated  with  better  earnings  quality,  financial  performance,  and 
abnormal  returns  (see  the  discussion  in  section  II).  Furthermore,  post-IPO  performance  has 
strong wealth implications, especially for PE sponsors that hold large ownership stakes before 
and after an IPO (Cao and Lerner 2006). I therefore expect firms that are majority-owned by PE 
sponsors to outperform firms that are minority-owned by PE sponsors.
45  
                                                            
45 Alternatively, because higher financial reporting quality is costly, if the tighter monitoring associated with large-
stake PE ownership substitutes for earnings quality, earnings quality would be expected to decline with higher 
ownership stakes (Beuselinck and Manigart 2005). Due to their reputation concerns, PE sponsors are expected to 
acquire minority stakes only in firms that have better corporate governance in place. Furthermore, if going public is 
a value maximizing decision (Zingales 1995), PE sponsors would be hypothesized to take firms public when the 
value  added  by  ownership  concentration  no  longer  outweighs  the  monitoring  cost,  in  which  case  pre-IPO  PE 
sponsor-ownership and post-IPO performance would be negatively associated (Cao 2007).   32 
Untabulated analyses reveal no significant differences in earnings management between 
firms that are majority-owned and those that are minority-owned by PE sponsors (consistent with 
the results reported in Table 5, Panel A), and only weak evidence that firms that are majority-
owned by PE sponsors report more conservatively than firms that are minority-owned by PE 
sponsors. 
Untabulated analyses further reveal that, when I control for the reduction in ownership 
stake after the IPO (on both an absolute and a relative basis, and for both PE-backed and non-PE-
backed firms), all results remain qualitatively similar.   
 
PE Sponsor Size (Capital under Management)  
Because more firms that are majority owned by PE sponsors are owned by large PE 
sponsors (those with greater capital under management; see the discussion in section IV), I need 
to disentangle the influence of ownership stake (majority versus minority) and PE sponsor size, 
which was identified as the most appropriate proxy for PE sponsor reputation (Cao and Lerner 
2006). Overall, I expect firms with more reputable owners to establish better governance and 
have tighter monitoring, which are expected to be associated with better earnings quality and 
financial performance in the post-IPO period (Wongsunwai 2007, Ivanov et al. 2008). Cao and 
Lerner (2006) attribute superior post-IPO returns earned by firms with larger PE sponsors to 
these repeated players’ concern for their reputations.
46  
Untabulated analyses yield only weak evidence that firms owned by large PE sponsors 
have higher earnings quality—that is, engage in less upward earnings management (only in the 
pre-IPO period) and report more conservatively—than firms owned by small PE sponsors.  
                                                            
46 Smaller PE sponsors, on the other hand, might have greater need of external financing and so be more strongly 
motivated to increase the quality of their reported earnings in order to be able to secure cheaper public debt (Bharath 
et al. 2008).   33 
Table 9, Panel A further reports the results of the abnormal returns as well as financial 
performance analyses for firms owned by large PE sponsors relative to firms owned by small PE 
sponsors. Overall, abnormal returns and industry adjusted ROA are significantly higher for firms 
owned by large PE sponsors. These firms also have a lower percentage of delisting. The results 
of the market-to-book ratios are mixed. Table 9, Panel B reports the results of the Fama-French 
three factor calendar time portfolio regressions (5). Consistent with the finding above, firms that 
are owned by larger PE sponsors have higher average monthly abnormal returns. Taken together, 
these results indicate that lower engagement in pre-IPO earnings management, together with the 
ability of large PE sponsors to provide a higher level of monitoring and support, lead to better 
long-run financial and market-adjusted performance for firms owned by larger PE sponsors.  
 
Listing Status  
To gain insight into the influence of private and public listing status, I compare for a 
given ownership structure financial practices before and after the IPO.  
Stock-price penalties and the use of equity-based compensation are strong incentives for 
managers of U.S. public firms to manage earnings upward (Givoly et al. 2007b). This pattern is 
consistent with the view that the opportunity to manipulate stock price is a motive for earnings 
management (Jensen 2005). Moreover, all firm-year observations in my sample, both pre- and 
post-IPO, are subject to identical financial reporting regulations. But because pre-IPO firms are 
more closely held, many shareholders have “inside information” and therefore less need to rely 
on financial statements, and the quality of financial reporting is therefore predicted to be lower in 
the pre-IPO period (Ball and Shivakumar 2005). Timelier loss recognition is also associated with   34 
lower shareholder litigation costs (Skinner 1997), which creates an additional incentive for post-
IPO public firms to recognize losses in a more timely manner. 
Consistent with these predictions, and with the findings of Givoly at al. (2007b) and Ball 
and Shivakumar (2005), untabulated analyses reveal that post-IPO firms have greater upward 
earnings management and report more conservatively than pre-IPO firms, regardless of the initial 
controlling party. 
 
VI. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
Transition Periods  
In untabulated analyses, I identify specific earnings-management incentives that arise for 
firms engaged in “going private” (public to private) transactions such as LBOs and MBOs as 
well as in other contexts such as M&A and bankruptcy.  
Overall, my findings are consistent with the results of prior literature. First, I document 
lower unexpected discretionary accruals in the two years prior to an MBO transaction. This is 
consistent with managers’ incentive to act in their own financial interest and influence firm price 
in  their  favor  (DeAngelo  1986,  Perry  and  Williams  1994,  Wu  1997,  and  Marquardt  and 
Wiedman  2004).  Second,  I  find  higher  unexpected  discretionary  accruals  and  growth  in  net 
operating  assets  in  the  two  years  prior  to  an  LBO.  These  results  are  consistent  with 
entrepreneurs’ incentive to manage earnings upward prior to PE financing (Beuselinck et al. 
2005). Third, I find evidence consistent with upward earnings management by PE-backed public 
firms in the years prior to an M&A transaction, consistent with the assumption that these firms 
can anticipate an acquisition or initiate and plan for a sale and are therefore able to manage 
earnings accordingly (Erickson and Wang 1999). Finally, I find evidence of downward earnings   35 
management by PE-backed public firms in the two years prior to a bankruptcy filing relative to 
prior years. This result is consistent with the incentive of managers, especially in public firms, to 
avoid the threat of lawsuits by stakeholders (Rosner 2003). When I remove observations during 
these transition periods, the results are qualitatively similar.   
 
Restructuring Activities 
Renneboog and Simons (2005) argue that PE sponsors can create the “stronger incentive 
alignment with a focus on performance and value, the reduction in wasting corporate resources, 
and the improved monitoring capabilities embedded in the governance structure of an LBO.” PE-
backed  firms,  therefore,  especially  in  the  pre-IPO  period,  might  be  involved  in  more 
restructuring activities than non-PE-backed firms, which might affect the results of this study.  
I  identify  and  compare  for  PE-backed  and  non-PE-backed  firms  several  proxies  for 
restructuring activities including magnitude of discontinued operations, involvement in M&A 
activities, and yearly increase or decrease in assets greater than 50%. This analysis reveals that 
the involvement of both groups of firms in restructuring activities is not significantly different in 
the period surrounding an IPO. When I remove observations during restructuring periods, the 
results are qualitatively similar.  
 
Underwriter Reputation  
Table 8 indicates that PE-backed firms have significantly higher underwriter reputation 
and significantly lower pre-IPO abnormal accruals than management-owned firms. The same 
holds true for firms owned by large PE sponsors relative to firms owned by small PE sponsors 
(Table 9). Moreover, a significantly higher percentage of firms that are majority owned by PE   36 
sponsors are also owned by large PE sponsors, and vice versa. To untangle the influence of these 
factors and verify that the abnormal return results are not driven by them, I further control for 
underwriter reputation, pre-IPO abnormal accruals, and PE sponsor size and ownership stake 
(when applicable). The main abnormal return results are qualitatively similar.
47 
 
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, I explore for a unique sample of U.S. private firms with public debt whether 
ownership structure, that is, being PE-backed or non-PE-backed, affects earnings management, 
conservatism, and post-IPO performance in the period surrounding an IPO. In addition, for the 
sub-group of PE-backed firms, I examine the association between the PE sponsor’s ownership-
stake and size and the firm’s earnings quality and performance.  
Consistent  with  my  predictions,  I  find  that  the  presence  of  and  monitoring  by 
sophisticated  PE  sponsors  restrains  upward  earnings  management  and  induces  a  higher 
frequency  of  timely  loss  recognition,  both  pre-  and  post-IPO.  I  further  find  that  majority 
ownership  by  a  PE  sponsor  is  associated  with  better  stock  price  performance  relative  to 
management-owned firms, and that larger PE sponsor size is positively associated with both 
better long-term financial and stock price performance when a firm goes public. These results 
can be attributed to less upward earnings management, more timely loss recognition, and tighter 
monitoring and control by PE sponsors, both pre- and post-IPO. Firms minority-owned by PE 
sponsors, on the other hand, have worse long-term financial and stock price performance in the 
years following an IPO than management-owned firms because of the lesser ability of these PE 
sponsors to control and monitor. 
                                                            
47 Specifically, for each period I run the following regressions: Abnormal_Returnst = a0 + a1*Dummy_Ownership + 
a2*Underwriter_Reputation + a3*Avg_Pre-IPO_UTACC + a4*Dummy_Large_PE_Sponsor + 
a4*Dummy_Majority_PE_Ownership + et.   37 
This study has several limitations. Because I focus on private firms with public debt that 
later file for public listing, I end up with a relatively small sample size (147 firms and 1,070 
firm-year observations). To be able to raise public debt, these firms are more likely to be larger 
and have better earnings quality than other private firms (Bharath et al. 2008). For these reasons, 
it is unclear whether this sample is representative of the universe of reverse buyouts overall. 
Potential sample selection bias concerns, however, are mitigated because these limitations apply 
to both PE-backed and non-PE-backed firms in my sample.  
It is worth exploring the incentives for PE-backed and non-PE-backed firms to manage 
earnings  in  order  to  minimize  taxes  or  manipulate  bond  prices,  and  the  association  of  both 
actions  with  auditor  compensation.  Comparing  PE-backed  and  non-PE-backed  firms  in 
international settings could enhance the results obtained in this study of domestic firms, and shed 
further light on the effect of institutions on PE-backed and non-PE-backed firms (Leuz 2006).    38 
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Private Firms with Public Debt (1980-2005) 
 
a The sample of “potential” private firms with public debt covers all firm-year observations on COMPUSTAT for 
any of the 28 years from 1978 to 2005 that satisfy the following criteria: (1) the firm’s stock price at fiscal year end 
is unavailable; (2) the firm has total debt as well as total revenues exceeding $1 million; (3) the firm is a separate 
domestic company, not a subsidiary of another public firm; and (4) the firm has the financial data needed to test the 
hypotheses for at least two years. I further exclude financial institutions and firms in other regulated industries (SIC 
codes 6000-6999 and 4800-4900). 
 
b  COMPUSTAT reports three years of historical information for public firms that file for initial public offering. This 
financial information is taken from the prospectus.   
 
c  “Other”  includes  observations  of  the  same  firm  with  different  names,  firms  with  no  consecutive  years  of 
information, firms that have joint ventures and partnerships with public firms, holding companies of public firms, 
and observations with information available only for the years 1978-1979. 
 
d Firms that are owned by PE sponsors or management and that filed for an initial public offering (IPO). The firm-
year observations include the period of five years before and five years after the IPO.  
 





Observations  No. of Firms 
“Potential” private firms with public debt 
(COMPUSTAT)
a          13,062  3,355 
Historical prospectus data
b  (3,233)  (1,242) 
Public firms   (2,324)  (371) 
Subsidiaries of public firms  (561)  (102) 
Public spin-offs  (111)  (34) 
Firms in bankruptcy process  (295)  (100) 
Firms with no available information   (1,683)  (344) 
Foreign firms  (772)  (184) 
IPO year  (116)  (116) 
Other
c  (737)  (280) 
Subtotal  3,230  582 
1978-1979 Firm-year Observations  (65)  0 
Cooperatives, LPs, and Government-owned Firms   (355)  (25) 
Private firms with public debt  2,810  557 
IPO firms (11 years surrounding the IPO)
d  1,070  147   44 
Table 2  




Total Majority Minority Mgmt  Employ. Unknown
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No. of Firms 557 319 77 121 19 32
No. of Firm-year Observations 2,810 1,408 355 649 223 175
Panel A: Financial Measures of Sample
Total Assets Mean 653 592 607 662 1,175 772
(in $ millions) Median 355 388 303 295 372 215
Std. Dev. 850 632 958 931 2,038 969
t-stat
b -2.6* -0.9 0.2 3.8*** 1.6
Total Sales Mean 809 665 867 908 2,163 383
(in $ millions) Median 413 423 450 385 691 294
Std. Dev. 1,184 735 1,335 1,531 3,458 336
t-stat -4.8** 0.8 1.5 5.7** -12.5**
Sales Growth Mean 6.1% 5.1% 7.0% 6.1% 7.9% 8.3%
Median 4.9% 3.7% 4.7% 4.8% 8.3% 6.5%
Std. Dev. 14.2% 14.8% 15.1% 13.7% 8.6% 16.5%
t-stat -1.8* 1.0 0.1 2.7*** 1.6
Leverage Mean 68.0% 76.5% 77.9% 63.1% 25.8% 53.8%
Median 67.0% 72.2% 73.8% 64.7% 21.6% 46.4%
Std. Dev. 31.5% 30.0% 27.0% 27.8% 20.3% 25.9%
t-stat 8.4*** 6.2** -3.9** -27.8*** -6.9***
ROA Mean 4.7% 3.3% 3.8% 6.7% 8.1% 3.6%
Median 5.3% 4.6% 5.0% 6.1% 7.9% 5.3%
Std. Dev. 7.3% 8.0% 8.5% 6.4% 5.2% 10.3%




*** significance at the 0.01level, ** significance at the 0.05 level, * significance at the 0.10 level. 
The distribution of each variable is truncated at the extreme ±1% values. 
 
a Ownership of private equity firms was determined based on the majority or minority ownership. Management 
ownership was based on the holdings of the founders, top executives, directors, and family members. Employee 
ownership was based on the holdings of employees including their pension and stock option plans. The “unknown” 
category generally consists of firms with no available information regarding ownership. 




Total Assets  Total end-of-the-year assets in millions of dollars (COMPUSTAT data item #6).      
Total Sales  Sales (net) in millions of dollars (#12).       
Leverage  Total debt (#9+#34) divided by total assets at end of the year (#6).       
Sales Growth   Growth in sales (#12) from year t–1 to year t. 
ROA  Net income (#172) plus net of tax interest expense (#15) divided by total assets at end of year t–1 
(lagged #6). 
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Table 2 (continued) 
Descriptive Statistics on Private Firms with Public Debt 
 
PE PE
Total Majority Minority Mgmt  Employ. Unknown
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
No. of Firms 557 319 77 121 19 32
No. of Firm-year Observations 2,810 1,408 355 649 223 175
Panel B: Industry Affiliation (two-digit SIC codes)
Mining & Construction (10-17) 3.2% 2.2% 1.3% 7.4% 5.3% --
Manufacturing I (20-29) 23.9% 22.6% 27.3% 27.3% 15.8% 21.9%
Manufacturing II (30-39) 30.3% 36.7% 23.4% 21.5% 10.5% 28.1%
Transportation & Public Utilities (40-49) 3.8% 3.4% 2.6% 2.5% 10.5% 9.4%
Retail & Wholesale Trade (50-59) 21.9% 21.0% 33.8% 19.8% 10.5% 25.0%
Services 16.3% 14.1% 10.4% 20.7% 42.1% 15.6%
Other 0.5% -- 1.3% 0.8% 5.3% --
Panel C: S&P Senior Debt Ranking (#280)
BBB or Better 2.9% 0.2% 2.0% 0.3% 13.9% 22.3%
BB 9.3% 9.4% 3.7% 13.4% 6.3% 8.6%
B 41.6% 53.1% 52.1% 30.8% 6.3% 13.1%
C - CCC 4.6% 5.6% 6.5% 4.0% -- --
D and Selective Default 0.3 0.2% -- 0.8% -- 0.6%
Not Rated  41.2% 31.4% 35.8% 50.7% 73.5% 55.4%
Panel D: Change in Status during the Sample Period 
IPO 28.4% 30.1% 35.1% 19.8% 31.6% 21.9%
Bankruptcy  16.2% 17.2% 19.5% 13.2% 5.3% 15.6%
M&A 16.5% 16.9% 14.3% 12.4% 21.1% 28.1%
Deregistration  15.6% 14.1% 6.5% 28.1% 5.3% 6.3%
Total percent  of firms that changed value  76.7% 78.4% 75.3% 73.6% 63.2% 71.9%
Panel E: Size of PE Sponsor Firms
a
Tier 1 3.1% 6.0% 0.8%
Tier 2 7.4% 13.1% 6.5%
Tier 3 4.8% 9.2% 1.1%
Other 84.7% 71.6% 91.5%
 
a PE sponsors are ranked according to total investment (in $US) during the years 1980-2005.  
Tier 1 includes:   Warburg Pincus, Carlyle Group, and KKR.  
Tier 2 includes:   Apax, Blackstone, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, Welsh Carson Anderson & Stone, and Hicks 
Muse Tate & Furst.  
Tier 3 includes:   3i Group, Bain Capital, Thomas H. Lee, Morgan Stanley, and Cinven. 
  
Source:  Thomson Financials, VentureXpert.Table 3  
Descriptive Statistics Pre-IPO and Post-IPO 
 
PE PE PE PE
Majority Minority Mgmt Diff.
a Diff. Diff. Majority Minority Mgmt Diff. Diff. Diff.
(1) (2) (3) (1) - (2) (1) - (3) (2) - (3) (4) (5) (6) (4) - (5) (4) - (6) (5) - (6)
No. of Firms 96 27 24 70 23 21
No. of Firm-year Observations 329 85 86 254 93 76
Total Assets Mean 849 814 1146 35 -296* -331 1412 1228 1483 184 -71 -255
(in $ millions) Median 516 390 382 126*** 134*** 8 913 654 594 260*** 319*** 60
Total Sales Mean 974 979 963 -6 10 16 1886 1354 891 532** 996*** 463**
(in $ millions) Median 540 533 504 7 36*** 29 1127 782 661 345*** 466*** 121*
Sales Growth  Mean 6.9% 8.5% 7.6% -1.6% -0.7% 0.9%*** 9.3% 8.2% 14.7% 1.0% -5.4% -6.5%
Median 5.5% 4.6% 5.2% 0.9%*** 0.3%*** -0.6% 7.5% 4.4% 9.1% 3.1%*** -1.6%*** -4.7%
Leverage Mean 72.8% 76.5% 58.3% -3.7% 14.5%*** 18.2%*** 47.7% 50.5% 42.2% -2.8% 5.5%* 8.3%**
Median 68.7% 71.0% 54.5% -2.3%*** 14.2%*** 16.5% 45.0% 44.7% 44.8% 0.3%*** 0.2%*** -0.1%
ROA Mean 5.2% 3.4% 3.6% 1.9% 1.7% -0.2% 5.2% 4.4% 5.1% 0.8% 0.2% -0.7%
Median 5.5% 5.4% 5.1% 0.1%*** 0.4%*** 0.3% 6.3% 5.5% 5.0% 0.8%*** 1.3%*** 0.6%
Q-Ratio Mean 83.2% 70.3% 109.6% 13.0%** -26.4%*** -39.3%*** 81.3% 85.2% 105.1% -3.9% -23.8*** -19.9%*
Median 75.1% 62.4% 102.9% 12.7%*** -27.8%*** -40.6% 73.9% 69.2% 91.4% 4.7%*** -17.5%*** -22.1%
Cash  Mean 3.9% 4.2% 5.8% -0.4% -2.0%** -1.6% 4.5% 4.0% 7.9% 0.5% -3.4%*** -3.9%***
Median 2.1% 1.3% 2.4% 0.8%*** -0.3%*** -1.1% 1.7% 1.2% 3.2% 0.5%*** -1.5%*** -2.0%
TACC  Mean -7.9% -7.8% -5.1% -0.1% -2.9%** -2.7%* -5.1% -6.7% -6.1% 1.6%** 0.9% -0.6%
Median -6.9% -7.1% -5.2% 0.2%*** -1.7%*** -1.8%* -4.7% -6.2% -5.9% 1.45*** 1.2%*** -0.3%**
CFO  Mean 7.6% 5.1% 4.2% 2.5% 3.4% 0.9% 7.7% 9.6% 7.3% -1.9%* 0.5% 2.3%*
Median 6.8% 5.3% 5.7% 1.4%* 1.1%* -0.4% 8.3% 8.2% 7.3% 0.1%*** 1.0%*** 0.8%**
Special Items  Mean -2.1% -3.1% -1.9% 1.0% -0.3% -1.3% -2.7% -2.4% -2.5% -0.3% -0.2% 0.1%
Median -0.9% -1.0% -1.1% 0.1%*** 0.3%*** 0.1% -1.5% -1.0% -0.6% -0.5%*** -0.9%*** -0.4%
Proportion
b 42.2% 34.1% 24.4% 8.1% 17.8%*** 9.7% 57.5% 58.1% 59.2% -0.6% -1.7% -1.1%
% of Loss Firms  Mean 48.6% 57.6% 36.0% -9.0% 12.6% 21.6% 22.8% 34.4% 27.6% -11.6%** -4.8% 6.8%
% Audited by a "Big" Auditor Mean 96.0% 82.4% 93.0% 13.7% 3.0% -10.7% 99.6% 93.5% 97.4% 6.1%** 2.2% -3.8%
5 Years Pre-IPO 5 Years Post-IPO
 
*** significance at the 0.01level, ** significance at the 0.05 level, * significance at the 0.10 level. 
   The distribution of each variable is winsorized at the extreme ±1% values.  
a Differences in means are tested for significance using a two-tailed t-test; differences in medians are tested for significance using a two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank 
test.    47 
Table 3 (Continued) 
Descriptive Statistics Pre-IPO and Post-IPO 
 
b Proportion is calculated as the number of observations that reported special items divided by the total number of observations. Statistical significance is assessed 




Total Assets  Total end-of-the-year assets in millions of dollars (COMPUSTAT data item #6).      
Total Sales  Sales (net) in millions of dollars (#12).       
Leverage  Total debt (#9+#34) divided by total assets at end of the year (#6).       
Sales Growth   Growth in sales (#12) from year t–1 to year t. 
ROA  Net income (#172) plus net of tax interest expense (#15) divided by total assets at end of year t–1 (lagged #6). 
Q-Ratio  Cash and short-term investment (#1) plus total receivables (#2) divided by current liabilities (#5). 
Cash  Cash and short-term investment (#1) divided by total assets at end of year t (#6). 
TACC  Total accruals divided by total assets at end of year t–1 (lagged #6). For year>=1988: total accruals [income before extraordinary items (SCF) 
(#123) – net cash flow from operating activities (#308) + extraordinary items and discounted operations (SCF) (#124)] divided by total assets at 
end of year t–1 (lagged #6). For year<1988: [change in current assets during period t (#4) – change in current liabilities during period t (#5) – 
change in cash and cash equivalents during period t (#1) + change in current maturities of long-term debt and other short-term debt included in 
current liabilities during period t (#34) – depreciation and amortization expense during period t (#125)].     
      In addition, I eliminated firm-year observations with the following "non-articulation" events: 
firm-year observations in which a company is involved in a merger or acquisition (#AFTNT35 code #1); firm-year observations in which a 
company reports "discontinued operations" greater than $10,000 (#66); and firm-year observations in which a company reports a gain or loss 
on foreign currency translations greater than $10,000 (#150) (Hribar and Collins 2002).  
CFO  Cash flow from operations divided by total assets at the end of year t–1. For year>=1988: net cash flow from operating activities (#308) 
divided by total assets at end of year t–1 (lagged #6). 
For year <1988: [funds from operations (#110) – change in current assets during period t (#4) + change in cash and cash equivalent during 
period t (#1) + change in current liabilities during period t (#5) – change in current maturities of long-term debt and other short-term debt 
included in current liabilities during period t (#34)]. All variables are divided by total assets at end of year t–1 (lagged #6) (Xie 2001). 
Special Items   Special items (#17) divided by total assets at end of year t–1 (lagged #6). 
Loss Firms  Firms with negative net income (#172) during year t. 
Audited by 
“Big” Auditor  Percentage of firms audited by one of the big national auditing firms (#149). 




PE PE PE PE
Majority Minority Mgmt Diff.
a Diff. Diff. Majority Minority Mgmt Diff. Diff. Diff.
(1) (2) (3) (1) - (2) (1) - (3) (2) - (3) (4) (5) (6) (4) - (5) (4) - (6) (5) - (6)
No. of Firms 62 12 18 62 12 18
Board
Chair CEO Mean 56.5% 83.3% 61.1% -26.9%** -4.7% 22.2% 54.8% 91.7% 61.1% -36.8%*** -6.3% 30.6%**
Insiders Mean 33.9% 29.9% 56.7% 4.0% -22.7%*** -26.7%*** 25.3% 27.6% 37.4% -2.4% -12.1%*** -9.8%**
Median 29.3% 28.6% 50.0% 0.7%*** -20.7%*** -21.4%*** 22.2% 28.6% 40.0% -6.3%*** -17.8%*** -11.4%*
PE on Board Mean 55.2% 34.0% 21.1%*** 50.3% 29.4% 20.9%***
Median 57.1% 37.5% 19.6%*** 50.0% 31.0% 19.0%***
Board Size Mean 7.1 6.3 5.4 0.8** 1.7** 0.9 8.2 6.3 6.6 1.8*** 1.5*** -0.3
Median 7.0 6.0 5.0 1.0*** 2.0*** 1.0 8.0 7.0 6.5 1.0*** 1.5*** 0.5
CEO Compensation
Options Mean 68.4% 68.7% 13.2% -0.2% 55.3%** 55.5%** 69.9% 65.7% 46.9% 4.2% 23.0%* 18.8%
(% of total compensation) Median 71.0% 68.7% 13.2% 2.3%*** 57.8%*** 55.5% 74.3% 66.1% 43.7% 8.2%*** 30.6%*** 22.4%
Total Options Mean $3.93 $1.17 $0.09 $2.76*** $3.84 $1.10 $8.41 $3.36 $0.65 $5.04 $7.76*** $2.72
(in $ millions) Median $1.78 $1.17 $0.09 $0.61*** $1.69*** $1.10 $2.74 $1.55 $0.39 $1.18*** $2.34*** $1.16
Variable Mean 61.9% 55.2% 51.8% 6.7% 10.2% 3.5% 73.8% 69.0% 45.4% 4.8% 28.4%*** 23.6%**
(% of total compensation) Median 59.7% 58.0% 54.6% 1.7%*** 5.1%*** 3.4% 82.5% 69.8% 50.2% 12.7%*** 32.3%*** 19.6%
Total Comp Mean $1.06 $0.77 $1.36 $0.29* -$0.30 -$0.59* $1.62 $1.09 $0.77 $0.53 $0.84** $0.32
(in $ millions) Median $0.78 $0.68 $0.82 $0.10*** -$0.04*** -$0.14 $0.95 $0.72 $0.60 $0.23*** $0.35*** $0.12
Ownership
CEO Mean 5.6% 14.9% 38.3% -9.3%* -32.7%*** -23.4%** 3.2% 6.2% 15.0% -3.1% -11.8%* -8.8%
Median 3.0% 11.2% 26.4% -8.3%*** -23.5%** -15.2% 1.9% 3.8% 8.0% -1.9%*** -6.1%*** -4.2%
Mgmt Mean 12.9% 15.3% 57.0% -2.5% -44.2%*** -41.7%*** 6.5% 12.5% 49.6% -6.0%* -43.0%*** -37.0%***
Median 9.4% 13.1% 68.5% -3.7%*** -59.1%* -55.4% 4.6% 13.4% 51.6% -8.8%*** -47.0% -38.2%**
PE Sponsor Mean 79.9% 36.4% 43.5%*** 48.9% 20.8% 28.0%***
Median 82.8% 39.9% 42.9%*** 50.1% 20.5% 29.6%***
Pre-IPO Post-IPO
 
*** significance at the 0.01level, ** significance at the 0.05 level, * significance at the 0.10 level. 
a Differences in means are tested for significance using a two-tailed t-test; differences in medians are tested for significance using a two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank 
test.    49 
 





Chair CEO  Percentage of firms in which the CEO is the chairman of the board of directors.  
 
Insiders   Number of directors who serve as executives in the firm divided by total board size. 
 
PE on Board  Number of directors who represent PE sponsors divided by total board size. 
 
Board Size  Total number of directors on the board of directors. 
 
Options  Total options divided by the sum of the total comp and total options.  
 
Total Options  Cumulative value of options distributed to the CEO during her/his tenure as well as the cumulative value of options realized. When the 
cumulative value was absent, the average value of options distributed during the year was used. 
 
Variable  Sum of the total option, bonus, other annual compensation, and other compensation (excluding salary) divided by the total comp and total 
options. (Note: Variable includes instances in which options were NOT distributed.)  
 
Total Comp  Sum of the salary, bonus, other annual compensation, and other compensation.  
 
CEO     Percentage owned by the CEO. 
 
Mgmt    Percentage owned by the management. 
 
PE    Percentage owned by the PE sponsors.   50 
Table 5 
Magnitude of Abnormal Accruals and Growth in Net Operating Assets
  
 
Panel A: Univariate Analysis  
N UTACC GNOA N UTACC GNOA N UTACC GNOA UTACC GNOA UTACC GNOA UTACC GNOA
Years (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (1) - (3) (2) - (4) (1) - (5) (2) - (6) (3) - (5) (4) - (6)
5 Years Mean  277 -3.7% -4.9% 69 -4.2% -9.6% 79 -0.3% -0.9% 0.5% 4.7%** -3.4%*** -4.0% -3.9%*** -8.7%*
Pre-IPO Median -3.5% -3.2% -2.1% -7.9% -1.1% -2.9% -1.4%* 4.7%** -2.3%*** -0.3%*** -1.0%** -4.9%**
5 Years Mean  206 -1.4% -2.1% 81 -1.4% -0.9% 62 5.4% 13.9% 0.0% -1.2% -6.8%* -16.0%** -6.8%* -14.8%**
Post-IPO Median -0.8% -0.6% -1.2% -2.9% 1.5% 0.4% 0.4% 2.3% -2.3%** -1.0%*** -2.7%** -3.3%***
Avg. 5 Years  Mean  -0.3% -1.5% -1.4% 2.3% 3.3% 13.4% 1.1% -3.7% -3.6% -14.9%** -4.7% -11.2%*
Post-IPO
b Median -0.6% -0.8% -0.2% 1.2% 1.7% 4.9% -0.4% 1.2% -2.3%* -5.6%* -1.9% -3.6%
-5 Mean  32 -4.9% 6.0% 5 -8.7% -22.7% 12 8.8% 15.8% 3.9% 28.7% -13.7%*** -9.8% -17.6%** -38.5%*
Median -4.0% -1.5% -1.3% -15.4% 7.1% -0.6% -2.7%*** 14.0% -11.1%*** -0.8% -8.4%*** -14.8%*
-4 Mean  48 -3.5% -5.5% 11 -25.5% 86.6% 13 -3.8% 7.0% 21.9% -92.1% 0.3% -12.5% -21.6% 79.6%
Median -2.8% -2.6% -2.3% -10.0% -4.0% -2.2% -0.6%** 7.4%* 1.2% -0.4%** 1.8% -7.9%
-3 Mean  65 -4.3% -1.1% 18 -4.3% -8.0% 17 -2.0% -5.5% 0.0% 6.9% -2.3% 4.4% -2.3% -2.6%
Median -3.1% -6.4% -0.7% -7.1% -1.4% -6.4% -2.4%*** 0.7%** -1.7%*** 0.0%** 0.8% -0.7%
-2 Mean  87 -4.3% 1.4% 23 -5.9% 9.3% 20 -0.2% -3.8% 1.6% -7.9% -4.1%* 5.2% -5.7%** 13.1%
Median -3.7% -6.5% -4.5% -5.9% -1.6% -4.3% 0.8%** -0.7% -2.0%** -2.2%** -2.9%* -1.6%
-1 Mean  96 -4.3% 6.4% 27 -3.5% 5.7% 24 -0.1% -3.8% -0.7% 0.7% -4.1%** 10.2% -3.4% 9.5%
Median -3.9% -3.3% -5.4% -7.9% 1.1% -5.3% 1.5%*** 4.6% -5.0%*** 2.0% -6.5%** -2.6%
IPO Year Mean  84 -1.9% 5.7% 24 0.5% 25.1% 24 7.3% 365.4% -2.4% -19.4% -9.2% -359.7% -6.8% -340.3%
Median -1.3% 0.0% 0.5% -2.0% 1.1% 12.7% -1.7%*** 2.0% -2.4%** -12.7%* -0.6% -14.7%
+1 Mean  70 0.6% 11.9% 23 0.5% -0.5% 21 1.1% 46.9% 0.1% 12.4%* -0.5% -34.9% -0.6% -47.3%*
Median 0.3% 0.0% 0.2% -2.4% -1.1% 6.6% 0.1% 2.4% 1.3% -6.6% 1.2% -9.0%*
+2 Mean  60 -1.8% 3.8% 22 -3.3% 3.0% 17 16.1% 8.9% 1.5% 0.8% -17.9% -5.1% -19.4% -6.0%
Median -1.2% 0.0% -2.1% -0.3% -0.4% 0.3% 0.9% 0.3% -0.8% -0.3% -1.7% -0.6%
+3 Mean  49 4.3% -1.9% 20 -0.2% 8.7% 14 0.4% 2.8% 4.5% -10.6% 3.9% -4.7% -0.5% 5.9%
Median -0.8% -4.3% -0.3% 0.1% 2.9% -0.9% -0.5% -4.4%* -3.7%** -3.4%** -3.2% 1.0%
+4 Mean  41 -1.5% -6.9% 15 -4.0% 10.7% 12 -5.7% -6.8% 2.6% -17.7% 4.2% -0.1% 1.6% 17.5%
Median 0.1% -2.4% -2.6% -5.4% -1.3% 1.6% 2.7% 3.0% 1.4% -4.0%* -1.3% -7.0%
+5 Mean  34 -1.5% 6.2% 14 -1.3% -3.1% 12 -0.8% 17.6% -0.2% 9.3% -0.7% -11.4% -0.5% -20.7%
Median -1.0% 0.5% -1.8% -8.6% 0.1% -1.7% 0.8% 9.1% -1.1% 2.2% -2.0% -6.9%*
IPO Year  Mean  84 2.2% 24 3.7% 24 12.3% -1.5% -10.2% -8.6%
Current UACC
c Median 1.4% 2.6% 3.1% -1.2% -1.7%** -0.5%
Diff.
a PE Majority  Diff. PE Majority Diff. PE Minority 
PE Majority PE Minority Mgmt v. PE Minority v. Mgmt v. Mgmt 
 
*** significance at the 0.01level, ** significance at the 0.05 level, * significance at the 0.10 level.   51 
Table 5 (continued) 
Magnitude of Abnormal Accruals and Growth in Net Operating Assets
 
 
Panel B: Multivariate Analysis 
 
Predicted  Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
Independent Variable Sign (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4) (5) (5) (6) (6) (7) (7) (8) (8)
Intercept                  (a0)                      ? 0.031 1.37 -0.124 -2.74*** 0.197 2.59*** -0.247 -1.66* 0.134 1.33 0.167 1.09 0.964 6.91*** -0.492 -2.28**
PE                           (a1) - -0.081 -3.41*** -0.022 -2.35** -0.305 -3.81*** -0.022 -0.74 -0.156 -1.51 -0.071 -2.47** -1.029 -6.16*** -0.122 -2.99***
LAMBDA 0.030 1.74* 0.154 2.72**** 0.052 0.73 0.587 5.81***
PE*LAMBDA 0.020 0.76 0.024 0.29 -0.018 -0.19 -0.395 -2.82***
Pseudo-R-square
d 67.92% 67.92% 49.69% 49.69%
ln(Total Assets) -0.014 -1.99** 0.032 1.33 0.005 0.19 0.010 0.30
ln(Sales) 0.020 2.56** -0.008 -0.30 -0.017 -0.64 0.014 0.38
Book Value / Total Assets 0.070 2** 0.083 0.72 -0.034 -0.31 0.374 2.42**
Sales Growth  -0.062 -2.97*** 0.183 2.72*** -0.040 -0.54 0.074 0.70
Leverage 0.023 0.66 0.001 0.01 0.000 0.00 0.193 1.26
RNOA 0.036 4.7*** -0.009 -0.38 0.137 1.60 0.784 6.4***
Q-Ratio 0.016 1.96* 0.065 2.45** 0.024 0.85 0.042 1.04
Oper_Cycle 0.000 1.59 0.000 0.67 0.000 0.52 0.000 2.11**
Age 0.000 0.37 -0.001 -0.94 0.000 -0.05 -0.001 -0.92
Cash / Total Assets -0.104 -1.43 -0.238 -1.00 -0.198 -1.05 0.501 1.85*
CAPEX / Total Assets -0.079 -0.79 0.813 -2.48** 0.015 0.06 0.459 1.20
D_loss -0.032 -4.44*** -0.031 -1.33 -0.055 -1.79* 0.087 1.97**
D_Audit_Quality 0.057 2.69*** -0.011 -0.15 -0.031 -0.40 0.047 0.42
Adj-R-square 5.69% 26.25% 6.20% 13.37% 1.70% 3.92% 14.79% 27.87%
No. of Observations 297 297 304 304 319 319 324 324
5 Years Pre-IPO 5 Years Post-IPO
UTACC GNOA UTACC GNOA
 
*** significance at the 0.01level, ** significance at the 0.05 level, * significance at the 0.10 level.
 
The distribution of each variable is truncated at the extreme ±1% values.  
a Differences in means are tested for significance using a two-tailed t-test; differences in medians are tested for significance using a two-tailed Wilcoxon signed 
rank test.  
b The average of five years’ annual UTACC and GNOA variables. For firms that do not survive for five full years after the IPO, the maximum number of years 
for which COMPUSTAT data is available is used.   
c   Current unexpected discretionary accruals are derived from the cross-sectional modified Jones model used by Teoh et al. (1998a, 1998b). (See section III.) 
d MacKelvey-Zavonia Pseudo-R-square for the first stage PROBIT model in the Heckman (1979) procedure.  
Note: Panel A’s summary of five years’ pre-IPO and five years’ post-IPO excludes firm-year observations during restructuring periods.    52 
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UTACC  Unexpected  discretionary  total  accruals  are  derived  from  the  cross-sectional  modified  Jones  model  (see  section  III).  To  control  for  the 
asymmetric recognition of gains and losses, I augmented the modified Jones model with the following independent variables: cash flow from 
operations in year t (CFt), a dummy variable set to 1 if CFt <1 and 0 otherwise (DCFt), and an interactive variable, CFt x DCFt (Ball and 
Shivakumar (2006a).  
GNOA  Industry adjusted growth in net operating assets after subtracting the industry median (same 4-digit SIC codes) GNOA for the same year:  
GNOA j,t = (NOA j,t – NOA j,t–1) / |NOA j,t–1|, where: NOA: common equity: [common equity (#60) + preferred treasury stock (#227) – preferred 
dividends in arrears (#242)] + financial obligations: [debt in current liabilities (#34) + total long-term debt (#9) + preferred stock (#130) – 
preferred treasury stock (#227) + preferred dividends in arrears (#242)] – financial assets: [cash and short-term Investments (#1) + investments 
and advances minus other (#32)] + minority interest (#38) (Nissim and Penman 2003). 
PE  Dummy variable set to 1 for PE-backed firms (both majority- and minority-owned) and 0 for firms owned by management.  
LAMBDA:   Following the Heckman (1979) procedure, in the first stage I estimate a PROBIT model with, as predictors, size (alternatively defined as the 
natural logarithms of total assets or sales), ratio of book value of equity to total assets, growth (in sales), leverage, profitability (operating 
income divided by net operating assets), quick ratio, length of the operating cycle, age, cash and capital expenditures (both divided by total 
assets), a dummy for loss firms, and audit quality (a dummy for the big national accounting firms). Estimates of the PROBIT model are used to 
compute an inverse Mills’ ratio for each firm. In the second stage, the inverse Mills’ ratio is added to equation (2) as a control variable. To 
allow its coefficient to vary between the two groups of firms, an interactive variable (PE*LAMBDA) is also included. 
ln(Total Assets)  The natural logarithm of total assets (#6). 
ln(Total Sales)  The natural logarithm of total sales (#12). 
Book Value  Book value of equity: total common equity (#60) + carrying value of preferred stock (#130) + deferred taxes and investment tax credit (#35). 
Sales Growth   Growth in sales (#12) from year t–1 to year t. 
Leverage  Total debt (#9+#34) divided by total assets at end of the year (#6).       
RNOA  Operating Income (OpI) divided by net operating assets at end of year t-1 (NOAt-1), where: OpI: earnings: [net income (#172) – preferred 
dividends (#19) + change in marketable securities adjustment (change in #238) + change in cumulative translation adjustment (change in 
#230)] + net interest expense: [after-tax interest expense (#15 × (1 – marginal tax rate)) + preferred dividends (#19)  – after-tax interest income 
(#62 × (1 – marginal tax rate)) + minority interest in income (#49) minus the change in marketable securities adjustment (change in #238)], 
where the marginal tax rate is the top statutory federal tax rate plus 2% average state tax rate. The top federal statutory corporate tax rate was 
48% in 1971-1978, 46% in 1979-1986, 40% in 1987, 34% in 1988-1992, and 35% in 1993-2003 (Nissim and Penman 2003). 
Q-Ratio  Cash and short-term investment (#1) plus total receivables (#2) divided by current liabilities (#5). 
Oper_Cycle  Operating  cycle  days  (receivable  collection  period  plus  inventory  turnover  in  days),  calculated  as:  (yearly  average  accounts  receivable 
#2)/(total revenues/360 #12) + (yearly average inventory #3)/(cost of goods sold/360 #41). 
Age    Number of years since incorporation (first appearance on COMPUSTAT). 
Cash  Cash and short-term investment (#1) divided by total assets at end of year t (#6). 
CAPEX  Capital expenditures (#128) divided by total assets at end of year t (#6). 
D_Loss    Dummy variable set to 1 for firms with negative net income (#172) during year t and 0 otherwise. 
D_Audit_Quality Dummy variable set to 1 for firms audited by one of the big national auditing firms (#149).   53 
Table 6 
Timely Loss Recognition by Firm Type  
   
∆OpIt = a0 + a1*D∆OpIt -1 + a2*∆OpIt -1 + a3*D∆OpIt -1*∆OpIt –1 + a4*PE + a5*PE*D∆OpIt -1 + a6*PE*∆OpIt -1 + a7*PE*D∆OpIt–1*∆OpIt -1 + et   
       
Predicted  Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
Independent Variable Sign (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4) (5) (5) (6) (6)
Intercept                       (a0) ? 0.015 0.69 0.061 1.39 -0.182 -2.57** 0.018 0.66 0.046 0.52 -0.035 -0.38
D∆OpIt –1  (a1) ? 0.010 0.28 -0.006 -0.19 0.004 0.15 0.009 0.19 0.017 0.37 0.028 0.76
∆OpIt –1  (a2) ? -0.445 -1.7* -0.844 -3.06*** -1.052 -5.3*** -0.093 -0.50 -0.151 -0.77 -0.084 -0.55
D∆OpIt -1*∆OpIt –1  (a3) ? 0.396 1.06 0.764 2.2** 0.752 2.93** 0.342 1.04 0.560 1.29 -0.533 -1.38
PE  (a4) ? -0.028 -1.05 -0.043 -0.93 -0.041 -2.21** -0.026 -0.84 -0.013 -0.14 0.002 0.07
PE*D∆OpIt –1  (a5) ? -0.013 -0.33 -0.023 -0.61 0.022 0.84 -0.029 -0.58 -0.035 -0.68 -0.014 -0.35
PE*∆OpIt –1 (a6) + 0.548 1.68* 0.741 2.3** 1.185 5.12*** 0.064 0.30 0.088 0.39 -0.069 -0.40
PE*D∆OpIt-1*∆OpI t –1  (a7) - -1.023 -2.37** -1.182 -3.01*** -1.343 -4.74*** -1.017 -2.71*** -1.128 -2.41** -0.024 -0.06
LAMBDA ? 0.026 0.81 0.033 0.54




ln(Total Assets) -0.012 -1.10 -0.009 -0.64
ln(Sales) 0.023 1.99** 0.005 0.35
Book Value / Total Assets 0.113 2.13** 0.035 0.49
Sales Growth  0.058 1.65 0.037 0.96
Leverage 0.102 1.93* 0.077 1.17
RNOA 0.660 12.66*** 0.693 9.11***
Q-Ratio -0.010 -0.84 -0.009 -0.55
Oper_Cycle 0.000 1.72* 0.000 -1.09
Age -0.001 -2.46** 0.000 0.72
Cash / Total Assets 0.020 0.18 0.003 0.02
CAPEX / Total Assets -0.248 -1.52 -0.642 -3.76***
D_loss 0.005 0.47 -0.035 -1.88*
D_Audit_Quality 0.006 0.21 -0.006 -0.15
Adj-R-square 11.06% 19.11% 63.08% 7.21% 9.88% 49.00%
No. of Observations 258 210 210 306 246 246
5 Years Pre-IPO 5 Years Post-IPO
 
    *** significance at the 0.01level, ** significance at the 0.05 level, * significance at the 0.10 level.
 
Each variable in the table is truncated at the extreme ±1% values of its distribution. 
 
a MacKelvey-Zavonia Pseudo-R-square for the first stage PROBIT model in the Heckman (1979) procedure.    54 
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∆OpIt:   Change in the earnings measure from year t–1 to year t, standardized by net operating assets at the end of year t–1. Earnings are measured as 
operating income (OpI), as defined below.   
 
D∆OpI:    Dummy variable set to 1 if ∆OpIt -1 < 0 and 0 otherwise. 
 
PE:   Dummy variable set to 1 for PE-backed firms (both majority- and minority-owned) and 0 for firms owned by management.   
 
LAMBDA:   Following the Heckman (1979) procedure, in the first stage I estimate a PROBIT model with, as predictors, size (alternatively defined as the 
natural logarithms of total assets or sales), ratio of book value of equity to total assets, growth (in sales), leverage, profitability (operating 
income divided by net operating assets), quick ratio, length of the operating cycle, age, cash and capital expenditures (both divided by total 
assets), a dummy for loss firms, and audit quality (a dummy for the big national accounting firms). Estimates of the PROBIT model are used to 
compute an inverse Mills’ ratio for each firm. In the second stage, the inverse Mills’ ratio is added to equation (3) as a control variable. To 
allow its coefficient to vary between the two groups of firms, an interactive variable (PE*LAMBDA) is also included. 
OpI   Operating income divided by net operating assets (NOA) at end of year t–1, where: NOA: common equity: [common equity (#60) + preferred 
treasury stock (#227) – preferred dividends in arrears (#242)] + financial obligations: [debt in current liabilities (#34) + total long-term debt 
(#9) + preferred stock (#130) – preferred treasury stock (#227) + preferred dividends in arrears (#242)] – financial assets: [cash and short-term 
investments (#1) + investments and advances minus other (#32)] + minority interest (#38). Operating income: earnings: [net income (#172) – 
preferred dividends (#19) + change in  marketable securities adjustment (change in #238) + change in cumulative  translation adjustment 
(change in #230)] + net interest expense: [after-tax interest expense (#15 × (1 – marginal tax rate)) + preferred dividends (#19)  – after-tax 
interest income  (#62 × (1 – marginal tax rate)) + minority interest in income (#49) minus the change in marketable securities adjustment 
(change in #238)], where the marginal tax rate is the top statutory federal tax rate plus 2% average state tax rate. The top federal statutory 




All control variables are as defined in Table 5.    55 
Table 7 
Accrual Model for Timely Loss Recognition by Firm Type 
   
ACCt = b0 + b1*DCFOt + b2*CFOt + b3*DCFOt*CFOt + b4*PE + b5*PE*DCFOt + b6*PE*CFOt + b7*PE*DCFOt*CFOt + et   
 
Predicted  Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
Independent Variable Sign (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3) (4) (4) (5) (5) (6) (6)
Intercept  (b0) ? -0.038 -3.05*** -0.010 -0.40 -0.012 -0.28 -0.020 -1.54 -0.055 -1.73* -0.088 -2.35**
DCFOt (b1) ? 0.021 0.49 0.053 1.18 0.013 0.29 0.056 1.36 0.042 1.15 0.041 1.27
CFOt  (b2) - -0.284 -2.38** -0.375 -2.51** -0.615 -3.94*** -0.406 -3.65*** -0.397 -3.29** -0.466 -4.39***
DCFOt*CFOt (b3) ? -2.037 -2.15** -1.427 -1.60 -1.471 -1.65* 0.498 0.49 0.376 0.44 0.101 0.13
PE (b4) ? 0.010 0.72 -0.036 -1.47 -0.010 -0.68 0.012 0.84 0.054 1.65* 0.012 0.89
PE*DCFOt  (b5) ? -0.014 -0.30 -0.035 -0.74 -0.006 -0.13 -0.084 -1.9* -0.043 -1.04 -0.039 -1.06
PE*CFOt  (b6) ? -0.365 -2.77*** -0.170 -1.05 0.070 0.42 -0.118 -0.95 -0.077 -0.58 -0.050 -0.42
PE*DCFOt*CFOt  (b7) + 2.506 2.58** 1.593 1.68* 1.502 1.59 -0.210 -0.20 -0.543 -0.59 -0.101 -0.12
LAMBDA ? 0.020 1.32 -0.022 -1.14




ln(Total Assets) -0.020 -3.12*** -0.010 -1.79*
ln(Sales) 0.018 2.64** 0.013 1.97**
Book Value / Total Assets 0.013 0.43 0.080 2.87***
Sales' Growth  0.001 0.05 0.030 1.99**
Leverage -0.041 -1.38 -0.006 -0.23
Q-Ratio 0.019 2.88*** 0.007 1.81*
Oper_Cycle 0.000 0.87 0.000 3.57***
Age 0.000 0.90 0.000 0.02
Cash / Total Assets -0.104 -1.63 -0.141 -2.43**
CAPEX / Total Assets 0.166 1.84* 0.047 0.61
D_Audit_Quality 0.001 0.08 0.009 0.56
Adj-R-square 36.33% 36.67% 42.07% 24.41% 31.62% 45.30%
No. of Observations 371 293 293 400 295 295
5 Years Pre-IPO 5 Years Post-IPO
 
    *** significance at the 0.01level, ** significance at the 0.05 level, * significance at the 0.10 level.
 
Each variable in the table is truncated at the extreme ±1% values of its distribution.  
 
a MacKelvey-Zavonia Pseudo-R-square for the first stage PROBIT model in the Heckman (1979) procedure.  
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ACCt:  Total accruals divided by total assets at end of year t–1. For year>=1988: total accruals [income before extraordinary items (SCF) (#123) – 
net cash flow from operating activities (#308) + extraordinary items and discounted operations (SCF) (#124)] divided by total assets at end of 
year t–1 (lagged #6). For year<1988: [change in current assets during period t (#4) – change in current liabilities during period t (#5) – 
change in cash and cash equivalents during period t (#1) + change in current maturities of long-term debt and other short-term debt included 
in current liabilities during period t (#34) – depreciation and amortization expense during period t (#125)].     
  In addition, I eliminated firm-year observations with the following "non-articulation" events: 
firm-year observations in which a company is involved in a merger or acquisition (#AFTNT35 code #1); firm-year observations in which a 
company reports "discontinued operations" greater than $10,000 (#66); and firm-year observations in which a company reports a gain or loss 
on foreign currency translations greater than $10,000 (#150) (Hribar and Collins 2002).  
 
CFOt:  Cash flow from operations divided by total assets at the end of year t–1. For year>=1988: net cash flow from operating activities (#308) 
divided by total assets at end of year t–1 (lagged #6). 
For year <1988: [funds from operations (#110) – change in current assets during period t (#4) + change in cash and cash equivalent during 
period t (#1) + change in current liabilities during period t (#5) – change in current maturities of long-term debt and other short-term debt 
included in current liabilities during period t (#34)]. All variables are divided by total assets at end of year t–1 (lagged #6) (Xie 2001). 
 
DCFOt:   Dummy variable that is 1 if CFOt < 0 and 0 otherwise.  
 
PE:   Dummy variable set to 1 for PE-backed firms (both majority- and minority-owned) and 0 for firms owned by management.   
 
LAMBDA:   Following the Heckman (1979) procedure, in the first stage I estimate a PROBIT model with, as predictors, size (alternatively defined as the 
natural logarithms of total assets or sales), ratio of book value of equity to total assets, growth (in sales), leverage, profitability (operating 
income divided by net operating assets), quick ratio, length of the operating cycle, age, cash and capital expenditures (both divided by total 
assets), a dummy for loss firms, and audit quality (a dummy for the big national accounting firms). Estimates of the PROBIT model are used 
to compute an inverse Mills’ ratio for each firm. In the second stage, the inverse Mills’ ratio is added to equation (4) as a control variable. To 
allow its coefficient to vary between the two groups of firms, an interactive variable (PE*LAMBDA) is also included. 
 
All control variables are as defined in Table 5.  Table 8 
Market-Adjusted Performance by Firm Type 
 
Panel A: Market-Adjusted Performance  
PE PE
Majority Minority Mgmt Diff.
a Diff. Diff.
(1) (2) (3) (1) - (2) (1) - (3) (2) - (3)
No. of Firms 92 26 21
Size and Book-to-Market (5x5) Adj. Returns
b
1 Year Mean 19.1% -9.3% 3.9% 28.5% 15.3% -13.2%
t-stat (2.66) (1.81) (-0.97)
Median 8.8% -18.3% -12.6% 27.1%*** 21.4%** -5.7%
3 Year Mean 19.0% -27.5% -4.9% 46.5% 23.9% -22.6%
t-stat (2.59) (1.15) (-0.86)
Median 9.7% -36.7% -16.8% 46.3%** 26.5%* -19.9%
5 Year Mean 17.3% -56.8% -3.5% 74.1% 20.8% -53.4
t-stat (2.67) (0.58) (-1.66)
Median -0.4% -66.3% -12.9% 65.9%* 12.5% -53.4*
Industry Adj. ROA
1 Year Mean 0.7% 0.5% 1.7% 0.2% -1.0% -1.2%
Median 0.5% 0.7% 1.9% -0.3% -1.4% -1.2%
3 Year Mean -0.2% -1.1% -0.1% 1.0% -0.1% -1.1%
Median -0.2% -0.1% -0.7% -0.1% 0.4% 0.5%
5 Year Mean -0.2% -1.1% 0.4% 1.0% -0.6% -1.5%
Median -0.2% -0.6% 0.0% 0.5% -0.1% -0.6%
Market-to-Book
1 Year Mean 3.28 2.26 3.19 1.01 0.09 -0.92
Median 2.14 2.05 2.20 0.09*** -0.06*** -0.15
3 Year Mean 2.31 1.75 3.03 0.57 -0.72 -1.29*
Median 2.08 1.49 2.93 0.59*** -0.85*** -1.44
5 Year Mean 2.77 2.01 2.84 0.76 -0.07 -0.83
Median 2.36 1.86 1.62 0.50*** 0.74*** 0.24
Delisting
1 Year Mean 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
3 Year Mean 0.0% 7.7% 0.0% -7.7% 0.0% 7.7%
5 Year Mean 5.4% 11.5% 4.8% -6.1% 0.7% 6.8%
Pre-IPO UTACC Mean -4.0% -4.7% 0.4% 0.7% -4.4%*** -5.1%***
Median -3.5% -3.7% 0.7% 0.2%*** -4.2%*** -4.3%***
Underwriter Reputation  Mean 8.82 8.78 8.32 0.04 0.50 0.46
Median 9.10 9.10 8.83 0.00 0.27*** 0.27
Large PE Sponsors Mean 32.6% 3.8% 28.8%***
 
*** significance at the 0.01level, ** significance at the 0.05 level, * significance at the 0.10 level.
 
The distribution of each variable is winsorized at the extreme ±1% values.  
a  Differences  in  means  are  tested  for  significance  using  a  two-tailed  t-test;  differences  in  medians  are  tested  for 
significance using a two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test.  
b Due to the cross–correlation problem, the t-statistics for abnormal returns should not be translated into p-values; these 
t-statistics appear in parentheses.    58 
Table 8 (continued) 




Size and Book-to-Market (5x5) Adj. Returns: For each IPO, the adjusted market returns are calculated as the buy-
and-hold daily returns on the periods of 1 year, 3 years, and 5 years after the IPO, less the buy-and-hold returns on a 
Fama and French size and book-to-market (5x5) matched portfolio of daily value-weighted market returns index 
over the same period. The size and book-to-market portfolio returns are obtained from Kenneth French’s Web site; 
http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/data_library.html.  If  the  sample  firm  delists  during  the 
relevant period, I add the delist return to the firm’s buy-and-hold return and set the market-adjusted return equal to 
zero after the delisting date. When the delisting return is missing, I allocate it, following Shumway and Warther 
(1999) and the CRSP “white paper” on delisting returns (2001), according to the delisting code and exchange code. 
 
Industry Adj. ROA: The average of 1 year, 3 years, or 5 years after the IPO matched-adjusted return on assets, 
which is defined as net income (#172) plus net of tax interest expense (#15) divided by total assets at end of year t–1 
(lagged #6), minus the industry median ROA for the same period (based on 4-digit SIC codes). For firms that do not 
survive for the full 1 year, 3 years, or 5 years after the IPO, the maximum number of years for which COMPUSTAT 
data is available is used.   
 
Market-to-Book: The market-to-book ratio is measured at the end of 1 year, 3 years, or 5 years since the IPO. For 
firms that do not survive the full 1 year, 3 years, or 5 years after the IPO, the maximum number of years for which 
COMPUSTAT data is available is used. Market value of equity is defined as common shares outstanding (#25) 
multiplied by fiscal year closing price (#199). Book value of equity is defined as total common equity (#60) + 
carrying value of preferred stock (#130) + deferred taxes and investment tax credit (#35). 
 
Delisting:  The  percentage  of  firms  delisted  from  the  NYSE,  Amex,  or  Nasdaq  due  to  bankruptcy,  default,  or 
liquidation (CRSP delisting codes 400 and above). 
 
Pre-IPO UTACC: The average of 5 years’ pre-IPO annual UTACC. Unexpected discretionary total accruals are 
derived from the cross-sectional modified Jones model (see section III). To control for the asymmetric recognition 
of gains and losses, I augmented the modified Jones model with the following independent variables: cash flow from 
operations in year t (CFt), a dummy variable set to 1 if CFt <1 and o otherwise (DCFt), and an interactive variable, 
CFt x DCFt (Ball and Shivakumar 2006a). 
  
Underwriter Reputation: The lead underwriter reputation rankings as measured by Carter et al. (1998) and updated 
on Jay’s Ritter Web site: http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/rank.xls. 
 
PE Sponsor Size: PE sponsors are ranked according to total investment (in $US) during the years 1980-2005. Large 
PE sponsors include: Warburg Pincus, Carlyle Group, KKR, Apax, Blackstone, Goldman Sachs, J.P. Morgan, Welsh 
Carson Anderson & Stone, Hicks Muse Tate & Furst, 3i Group, Bain Capital, Thomas H. Lee, Morgan Stanley, and 
Cinven (Tiers 1-3 from Table 2). Small PE sponsors include all other PE sponsors. (Source: Thomson Financials, 
VentureXpert.) 
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Table 8 (continued) 
Market-Adjusted Performance by Firm Type 
 
Panel B: Fama-French Three Factors Calendar Time Portfolio Regressions 
 
 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
Independent Variable (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3)
PE Majority
Intercept                       0.004 0.82 0.003 0.99 0.001 0.39
RMF 1.211 7.77*** 0.953 9.41*** 0.911 10.28***
SMB 0.915 4.72*** 0.742 5.92*** 0.753 6.87***
HML 0.328 1.43 0.336 2.28** 0.386 2.99***
Adj-R-square 31.90% 38.78% 43.55%
No. of Observations 197 219 219
PE Minority
Intercept                       -0.014 -1.36 -0.006 -1.13 -0.004 -0.87
RMF 1.527 4.99*** 1.128 7.05*** 1.162 8.7***
SMB 0.985 2.41** 1.070 5.33*** 1.026 6.13***
HML 0.507 1.11 0.255 1.08 0.352 1.78*
Adj-R-square 18.83% 28.99% 36.63%
No. of Observations 149 232 232
Mgmt
Intercept                       -0.009 -0.95 -0.001 -0.08 -0.009 -1.51
RMF 1.382 4.65*** 1.148 5.56*** 1.289 7.61***
SMB 0.512 1.57 0.889 3.82*** 0.629 3.05***
HML 0.793 1.91* 0.281 1.01 0.460 1.89*
Adj-R-square 14.58% 22.51% 25.12%
No. of Observations 121 174 213
1 Year Ret 3 Years Ret 5 Years Ret
 
*** significance at the 0.01level, ** significance at the 0.05 level, * significance at the 0.10 level.
 
The distribution of each variable is truncated at the extreme ±1% values.  
 
Regression coefficients estimated in calendar time from the Fama-French (1993) three factor regression model:   
 
Rpt – Rft = ap + bp (Rmt – Rft) + spSMBt + hpHMLt + εt 
 
where Rpt is the equally weighted portfolio returns in calendar month t; Rft is the 30-day T-bill yield in month t; Rmt 
is the return on the value weighted CRSP index; SMBt is the return on small firms minus the return on large firms; 
and HMLt is the return on high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low book-to-market stocks in month t.    60 
Table 9  
Market-Adjusted Performance by PE Sponsor Size 
 





(1) (2) (1) - (2)
No. of Firms 31 87
Size and Book-to-Market (5x5) Adj. Returns
b
1 Year Mean 22.5% 8.8% 13.7%
t-stat (1.66)
Median 9.1% 1.7% 7.3%
3 Year Mean 42.3% -2.7% 44.9%
t-stat (1.85)
Median 17.6% -13.3% 30.8%
5 Year Mean 65.1% -27.8% 93.0%
t-stat (2.96)
Median 48.7% -31.3% 80.0%***
Industry Adj. ROA
1 Year Mean 3.3% -0.3% 3.6%**
Median 0.4% 0.5% -0.03%
3 Year Mean 1.5% -1.0% 2.5%*
Median 1.3% -0.4% 1.7%**
5 Year Mean 1.2% -1.0% 2.2%*
Median 0.8% -0.7% 1.5%**
Market-to-Book
1 Year Mean 1.86 3.53 -1.66
Median 2.21 2.14 0.07***
3 Year Mean 1.62 2.38 -0.76
Median 1.56 2.03 -0.48***
5 Year Mean 2.83 2.37 0.46
Median 2.23 2.23 0.01***
Delisting
1 Year Mean 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
3 Year Mean 0.0% 2.3% -2.3%
5 Year Mean 3.2% 8.0% -4.8%
Pre-IPO UTACC Mean -4.6% -3.9% -0.7%
Median -4.1% -3.5% -0.6%***
Underwriter Reputation  Mean 8.95 8.76 0.19*
Median 9.10 9.10 0.00
 
*** significance at the 0.01level, ** significance at the 0.05 level, * significance at the 0.10 level.
 
The distribution of each variable is winsorized at the extreme ±1% values.  
a  Differences  in  means  are  tested  for  significance  using  a  two-tailed  t-test;  differences  in  medians  are  tested  for 
significance using a two-tailed Wilcoxon signed rank test.  
b Due to the cross–correlation problem, the t-statistics for abnormal returns should not be translated into p-values; these 
t-statistics appear in parentheses.  
 
All variables are as defined in Table 8 Panel A.    61 
Table 9 (continued) 
Market-Adjusted Performance by PE Sponsor Size 
 
Panel B: Fama-French Three Factors Calendar Time Portfolio Regressions 
 
 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
Independent Variable (1) (1) (2) (2) (3) (3)
Large PE
Intercept                       0.012 2.59** 0.002 0.70 0.001 0.27
RMF 1.235 8.79*** 1.034 9.63*** 0.973 10.73***
SMB 0.965 5.56*** 0.832 6.39*** 0.810 7.36***
HML 0.349 1.71* 0.262 1.69* 0.339 2.58**
Adj-R-square 44.12% 39.26% 44.38%
No. of Observations 165 252 252
Small PE
Intercept                       -0.018 -2.06** -0.009 -1.55 -0.007 -1.34
RMF 1.332 5.12*** 1.020 6.37*** 1.107 8.07***
SMB 1.047 3.08*** 0.999 4.9*** 1.002 5.73***
HML 0.497 1.29 0.335 1.41 0.446 2.18**
Adj-R-square 17.87% 26.47% 34.94%
No. of Observations 183 198 198
1 Year Ret 3 Years Ret 5 Years Ret
 
*** significance at the 0.01level, ** significance at the 0.05 level, * significance at the 0.10 level.
 
The distribution of each variable is truncated at the extreme ±1% values.  
 
Regression coefficients estimated in calendar time from the Fama-French (1993) three factor regression model:   
 
Rpt – Rft = ap + bp (Rmt – Rft) + spSMBt + hpHMLt + εt 
 
where Rpt is the equally weighted portfolio returns in calendar month t; Rft is the 30-day T-bill yield in month t; Rmt 
is the return on the value weighted CRSP index; SMBt is the return on small firms minus the return on large firms; 
and HMLt is the return on high book-to-market stocks minus the return on low book-to-market stocks in month t.  